

AFIT/GSO/ENS/99M-01

MULTI-DISCIPLINE NETWORK  
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT  
THESIS

Karilynne Wallace, Captain, USAF  
AFIT/GSO/ENS/99M-01

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VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT

THESIS

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VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT

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## Abstract

“Air Force Space Command has a mission to provide real-time, survivable, and enduring communications, surveillance, environmental monitoring, navigation, and warning...” according to Air Force Space Handbook – A War Fighters Guide to Space. In order to prevent disruption of the critical networks in Space Command, a vulnerability assessment must be performed. The set of components called a vulnerability set, which could cause network disruption, must be identified and prioritized. In order to move beyond subjective prioritization, implementation of a quantitative methodology that measures the value of each vulnerability set is needed.

This thesis proposes a technique for vulnerability assessment of a multi-disciplined network consisting of components that satisfy primary functions and secondary supporting functions. A *Network Vulnerability Assessment Tool* was developed and used to analyze the network. The tool models the network as nodes and links. A cut-set algorithm generates potential vulnerability sets. The overall objective is to find sets that cause critical network disruptions. Value-focused thinking and decision analysis techniques are used to rank the vulnerability sets according to decision maker preferences. The value model is applied at the network and sub-network level. This allows for analysis of sub-network vulnerabilities that are not evident in the general network analysis. The network vulnerability sets are ranked to provide an overall vulnerability assessment. Sensitivity analysis provides insight into the driving factors of the vulnerability set prioritization.

# MULTI-DISCIPLINE NETWORK VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT

## I. Introduction

### Background

*“The principles of war: mass, objective, surprise, maneuver, the offensive, simplicity, unity of command, economy of force, and security apply fully and completely to space operations. As we have moved into space, we have not found reason to question these principles, nor have we discovered new ones.” [10:69]*

“The United States must win and maintain the capability to control space in order to assure the progress and pre-eminence of the free nations. If liberty and freedom are to remain in the world, the United States and its allies must be in position to control space” [9:19]. These words by General Thomas D. White, Air Force Chief of Staff, 1955, were restated in the Long Range Plan (LRP) of United States Space Command.

*As space products and services become ever more interwoven with our nation’s politics, economics, culture, and security, they become an increasingly lucrative target for potential adversaries. A future foe could gain an advantage by denying, disrupting, or destroying our ability to access and use space [9:19].*

As you can imagine, these words are just as critical today as they were in 1955.

Air Force Doctrine states it in a slightly different, but direct way. “Gaining air, and space superiority is a primary goal of a military campaign and must be achieved early to ensure freedom of action” [11:7].



It is important to discuss how space superiority can be achieved. To start the discussion, space control must be defined. Is the control of space really a critical part of the United States Air Force? If the US has control of space, has space superiority been achieved? If so, must the US take any further action to maintain this state? These questions are approached in the following quotation from Air Force Doctrine.

*Space Control is the means by which space superiority is gained and maintained to assure friendly forces can use the space environment while denying its use to the enemy. To accomplish this, space forces must survey space, protect the ability to use space, prevent adversaries from exploiting US or allied space services, and negate the ability for adversaries to exploit their space forces [11:8].*

The statements above highlight the importance of maintaining space control. This control can be gained and maintained by counterspace activities, both offensive and defensive. Defensive activities can be both active and passive. This thesis focuses on the passive, defensive aspect of counterspace. “The objectives of passive defense are to reduce the vulnerabilities and to protect and increase the survivability of friendly space forces and the information they provide” [11:10].

It is very important to protect the nation’s space systems to maintain space control. According to the LRP,

*Protection requires five key capabilities for 2020: (1) Detecting and reporting threats or attacks against all space systems of national interest in near real time is critical; (2) The ability to withstand and defend against attacks on space systems; (3) Reconstituting and repairing space capabilities critical to national interests (if defenses fail) must occur within days, or even hours; (4) Assessing mission impact is critical to course of action development; (5) Identifying, locating, and classifying the source of a threat, ranging from intentional hostile acts to accidents or naturally occurring space events pose great challenges [9:33-34].*

The abilities to withstand and defend against attacks, preserve critical assets, and reconstitute and repair those critical assets are the primary focus of this research. Air Force Space Command is comprised of a network of critical nodes and links used to “provide real-time, survivable, and enduring communications, surveillance, environmental monitoring, navigation, and warning for unified and specified commanders, the national command authorities, and the intelligence community” [10:84]. This network of assets is among the military’s “prime national security responsibilities” [10:70]. It must be protected. This requirement to protect comes from an objective to gain the control of space.

*Control of Space requires USCINCSpace to achieve five interrelated objectives: (1) assure the means to get to space and operate once there; (2) surveil the region of space to achieve and maintain situational understanding; (3) protect our critical space systems from hostile actions; (4) prevent unauthorized access to, and exploitation of, US and allied space systems and, when required, (5) negate hostile space systems that place US and allied interests at risk [9:20].*

Protecting the critical space systems is an objective Air Force Space Command must achieve. As the LRP states,

*Our nation’s increasing military and economic dependence on space power makes it likely for space to become a vital national interest. This same dependence also implies vulnerability. US interests and investments in space must be fully protected to ensure our nation’s freedom of action in space [9:viii].*

Space Command must have “the capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same” [9:10]. In order to provide this capability the Air Force must be able to defend and protect the network of space assets. The Air Force must “develop advanced models and simulation capabilities to help analyze nodes, identify effects and determine which

capabilities we must rapidly reconstitute” [9:38]. These models will identify major components of the Space Command network of assets that are critical for operation.

### **Statement of Problem**

The problem at hand is to develop a modeling and analysis capability to study nodes and links of a multi-disciplined network in Space Command. The analysis will determine which sets of nodes and links make the network most vulnerable to disruption. A multi-disciplined network consists of a network of components, which perform a primary function, and sub-network components, which perform secondary supporting functions. For example, the primary function of a communications network is communications, while the power station has the function of providing power to its corresponding component.

Analyzing the disruption of a multi-disciplined network begins with identification of a vulnerability set. This vulnerability set includes the links and nodes which could disrupt the network. The vulnerability sets are then analyzed to determine which are the most vulnerable and susceptible. Susceptible is referred to as vulnerabilities that are easily affected or disrupted. To assist in the process of vulnerability prioritization, a quantitative method is needed that will measure the significance or value of each vulnerability. Additionally, a method of finding and evaluating sub-network vulnerabilities is needed.

## Research Approach

This research uses a graph theory approach to portray the network and its major system components. A cut-set generation algorithm generates and identifies potential vulnerability sets comprised of the network's major components. Value-Focused Thinking (VFT) [16] develops a working value hierarchy to determine the objectives of the network. The hierarchy provides a structure, down to measurable attributes, which adequately define each objective. Assigned weights indicate each attributes relative importance within the hierarchy. Susceptibilities can be found using a value hierarchy which includes attributes that would define a susceptible component, for example, hardening or physical defense techniques.

Once the hierarchy is developed, the application creates a prioritized list of critical network vulnerabilities. Not only can this value hierarchy assess the components of the primary network but it can be used to assess vulnerabilities at the sub-network level, such as water and power. Thus, the analysis provides a comprehensive vulnerability assessment.

The cut-set algorithm and value model are accomplished via a *Network Vulnerability Assessment Tool* implemented in Visual Basic (VB). This package is designed to interface with an Excel spreadsheet in which the user inputs network and value hierarchy data. The tool was developed using Leinart's *Network Disruption Modeling Tool* [20] as a basis. New features of the software include an algorithm to find cut-sets of a directed network, sub-network analysis, and a routine to easily input new

value hierarchies. Additionally, the new software features sensitivity analysis to provide insight into the driving factors behind the vulnerability rankings. This analysis provides the decision maker an invaluable tool for finalizing the value hierarchy.

### **Scope/Limitations**

This thesis focuses on a command and control network of Air Force Space Command components including sub-network components. The sub-network components consist of a variety of media types, including such items as water and power.

The components and characteristics of the system are the nodes and links of the network. Therefore they also represent candidate vulnerabilities. It is assumed network disruption is accomplished once command and control is lost between a designated source node(s) and a designated sink node(s).

For the purpose of this research, network disruption does not include corruption of actual data, but instead is concerned with the destruction or degradation of network components, which stop or hinder the network flow.

The network objectives and attributes, which are used in the hierarchy, will not be representative of all command and control networks and all decision makers' preferences. This research incorporates a hypothetical decision maker's preferences and demonstrates the methodology for a notional network.

## **Thesis Overview**

This chapter has presented a brief background of the problem to be addressed. Chapter II provides a review of current literature in the area of networks, graph theory, cut-set determination, and value-focused thinking. Chapter III gives the methodology used to obtain and quantify network cut-sets and objectives to identify possible network vulnerabilities. Chapter IV analyzes the results of a command and control network scenario. Chapter V contains conclusions from the research and recommendations for additional related research.

## **II. Literature Review**

### **Introduction**

The goal of this chapter is to provide the theoretical background necessary to model and analyze complex network vulnerabilities. This chapter provides the relevant terms, concepts, and exposure to attack this problem. Additionally, there is information about several network modeling tools.

### **Networks**

A network is “a system or pattern made up of interconnecting parts” [31:460]. There are many kinds of networks which all serve a different function. This research is interested in examining a network of multi-disciplined parts. In particular, it examines a system of parts, or assets, which make up a subsystem of Air Force Space Command. In this case the network may be represented as a system of links and nodes which work together to ensure space control.

Air Force Space Command has several networks. For example, the Air Force Satellite Control Network (AFSCN) is a network of nodes and links. The AFSCN is a global network system that provides command, control, and communications for space vehicles. The many nodes of the AFSCN consist of dedicated (supporting a single program) and common-user (supporting many programs) equipment and facilities which, collectively, provide operational telemetry, tracking, and commanding (TT&C) support for Department of Defense (DOD) space vehicles plus selected National Aeronautics and

Space Administration (NASA) and foreign allied nations' space programs. In addition, nodes are both mobile and fixed. Network elements include tracking stations, computer facilities, communication links, satellites, and control centers. All of these elements combined with many others make up the network of nodes and links that meet the requirement for constant control, support, and direction of satellites [10:73-74].

Another Space Command network is the space surveillance network (SSN). The SSN includes many radar and tracking devices which give the ability to monitor, assess, and inform of space activities, which is essential to space control. The SSN uses many worldwide sensors to perform its mission [10:97].

Another network, which is not so obvious, is the network of assets used to launch a space vehicle or provide space reconnaissance photos. In addition, many times the sub-networks providing power, water, sewer, and computer lines go unrecognized. This research considers how to assess a network comprised of many assets; not only communication, or computers, but also sub-networks providing water, power, communication, and many other nodes and links.

Network topology describes the layout and resources that model a physical network. Topology in this case consists of nodes to represent hardware and links to represent transmission media between nodes. Complex networks of nodes and links may be organized hierarchically into sub-nets [4].



The networks of interest will include sub-networks. A simple example of a sub-network is a network of water pumping stations and water lines. The pump stations are the nodes of the sub-network and the supply lines are the links.

Network vulnerability is defined in many ways. The focus here is disruption that occurs when elements of the network breakdown or are destroyed. A network is vulnerable if two nodes can be disconnected. If a few components can be taken out of the network and cause there to be no more operational paths between the two nodes, the network is vulnerable [2:682]. It is susceptible if the two nodes are “easy” to disconnect. Therefore, the underlying concept of vulnerability is connectivity.

### **Graph Theory**

One way to model networks is through the use of graph theory. The network can be modeled by a graph. A graph consists of a finite set of points called nodes, connected by lines called links. Before proceeding, several definitions and concepts of graph theory need to be explained.

A graph that is in one piece is a connected graph; a graph in more than one piece is a disconnected graph. Both are shown in Figure 1. In addition, a graph is connected if it cannot be expressed as the union of two graphs, and disconnected otherwise [32:4,10].




Figure 1 (a) connected simple graph (b) disconnected simple graph

A simple graph  $G$  consists of a set of elements called vertices (or nodes), and a set of distinct elements called edges. The set of vertices may be designated as  $V(G)$  and the set of edges may be designated as  $E(G)$  [32:8].

In a simple graph there is at most one edge joining a given pair of vertices. However, many results that hold for simple graphs can be extended to more general objects in which two vertices may have several edges joining them. Figure 2 shows a general graph. The term general graph or, simply, a graph, is used for graphs with multiple edges [32:8].




Figure 2 General Graph

Therefore, a general graph  $G$  consists of a set of elements called vertices, and a family of (not necessarily distinct) elements called edges. The use of the word 'family' allows multiple edges. The set of vertices  $V(G)$  and the *family* of edges  $E(G)$  [32:9].

Two vertices  $v_1$  and  $v_2$  of a graph  $G$  are adjacent if there is an edge  $e_1$  joining them, and the vertices  $v_1$  and  $v_2$  are then incident with such an edge. Similarly, two distinct edges  $e_1$  and  $e_2$  are adjacent if they have a vertex in common [32:12]. Figure 3 shows an example of both adjacent vertices and edges.




Figure 3 (a) adjacent vertices (b) adjacent edges

### Cut-Sets

A disconnecting set in a connected graph  $G$  is a set of edges or vertices whose removal disconnects  $G$ . A cut-set is defined to be a disconnecting set, in which there is no proper subset. If  $G$  is a graph, a disconnecting set of  $G$  is a set of edges or vertices whose removal increases the number of components of  $G$ , and a cut-set of  $G$  is a disconnecting set, in which there is no proper subset [32:28-29]. In other words, a cut-set is a set of edges or vertices that if deleted, separate a connected graph into two or more components. The deletion of a proper cut-set results in precisely two components [3:29].

There are several kinds of cut-sets: vertex cut-set (also known as a separating set), where the vertices are removed (Figure 4(a)); edge cut-set, where the edges are removed (Figure 4(b)); and a mixed cut-set, where a combination of vertices and edges are removed (Figure 4(c)). The cut-set is the set of edges or vertices with the dotted line

drawn through them which separates the graph on the left into the disconnected graph on the right.




Figure 4 (a) edge cut-set (b) vertex cut-set (c) mixed cut-set.

If  $G$  is connected, its edge connectivity  $\lambda(G)$  is the size of the smallest cut-set in  $G$ . Thus,  $\lambda(G)$  is the minimum number of edges that need to be deleted to disconnect  $G$  [32:29].

A separating set, or vertex cut-set, is a set of vertices whose deletion disconnects  $G$ ; note that when a vertex is deleted, the incident edges are also removed. If  $G$  is connected and not a complete graph, its (vertex) connectivity  $\kappa(G)$  is the size of the

smallest separating set in  $G$ . Thus,  $\kappa(G)$  is the minimum number of vertices that need to be deleted to disconnect  $G$  [32:29].

### Directed Graphs

Graphs can be directed or undirected. Directed graphs occur when the edges have a direction from one vertex to another and only flow in one direction. Undirected graphs have no orientation and can flow in either direction.

Directed graphs, also called digraphs, are graphs that have the additional characteristic that every edge has been oriented or given a direction, as shown in Figure 5 [3:23,24]. A directed graph,  $D$ , consists of a set of elements called vertices, and a family of elements of called arcs. The set of vertices is  $V(D)$  and the family of arcs is  $A(D)$ . A directed graph is connected if it cannot be expressed as the union of two directed graphs [32:100-101]. The arcs consist of a head, the termination of the arc, and a tail, the start of the arc. Thus, the heads of the arcs in Figure 5 are the points of the arrows.




Figure 5 Directed Graph

In a directed graph the arcs of a cut-set can be classified into two groups: those directed from  $v_1$  to  $v_2$  and those directed from  $v_2$  to  $v_1$ . Removal of the former set

disconnects all paths from  $v_1$  to  $v_2$ , while removal of the latter disconnects all paths from  $v_2$  to  $v_1$  [3:30].

The study of graph theory and networks often involves the flow of information from one point to another point. In graph theory, the 'way of getting from one vertex to another' is defined as a walk. A path is a walk in which a vertex appears only once [32:3]. For example, a path in Figure 5 is  $1 \rightarrow 2 \rightarrow 4 \rightarrow 5 \rightarrow 7$ . This is also defined as a path set of the network.

Also associated with directed graphs are the terms source and sink. Wilson defines a source as a vertex with 0 arcs coming into the vertex, or in-degree 0, and a sink as a vertex with 0 arcs going out, or out-degree 0 [32:105]. For the purpose of this thesis the source is simply the start of the data and the sink is the point in the network where the information will be terminated. In fact, there can be more than one source and/or sink.

### Matrix Representation

Graph theory also uses matrices to represent network structure. Matrix representation is a convenient way to represent the structure of a graph. If  $G$  is a graph with  $n$  vertices and  $m$  edges, then the incident matrix is the  $n \times m$  matrix whose rows and columns correspond to the vertices and edges. Whenever a vertex is incident with an edge, a 1 appears, as shown in Figure 6 [3:101-102].




Figure 6 Incidence Matrix and Associated Graph

Another useful matrix representation of a graph is the cut-set matrix, each row of which characterizes one proper cut-set. In Figure 7, the proper cut-sets of a graph are shown.




Figure 7 Cut-sets and Associated Graph

The cut-set matrix for Figure 7 is

$$K = \begin{matrix} & \begin{matrix} v_1 & v_2 & v_3 & v_4 & e_1 & e_2 & e_3 & e_4 \end{matrix} \\ \begin{matrix} K_1 \\ K_2 \\ K_3 \\ K_4 \\ K_5 \\ K_6 \\ K_7 \\ K_8 \end{matrix} & \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \end{pmatrix} \end{matrix}$$

It is also useful to define an adjacency matrix, which represents the connected vertices. An adjacency matrix and its associated graph are shown in Figure 8.




Figure 8 Adjacency Matrix and Associated Graph

Graph theory can be used to represent the structure of a network and to find vulnerabilities using cut-set algorithms.

### Value Focused Thinking

After modeling and identifying all cut-sets of a network using graph theory, the cut-sets, or vulnerabilities, need to be prioritized. Value Focus Thinking can be used to rank the vulnerability sets based on a decision maker's values.

### Values

Value Focus Thinking begins by developing a value model to evaluate the alternatives. In doing so, tasks required to achieve the primary objective or goal and measures of merit that quantify the value of performing the task at different levels are identified. Top-level objectives describe aspirations that are most important to the decision maker. Objectives are decomposed until desired measures of merit can be specified. Weights are assigned to signify the relative importance of objectives at every level [8].



An important notion in VFT is value. Keeney says, “Values are what we care about. [Values] should be the driving force for our decision-making.” Values are principles used for evaluation. Ethics, derived traits, characteristics of consequences that matter, guidelines for action, value trade-offs, and attitudes toward risk all indicate values [16:3-7]. The central role of thinking about values is illustrated in Figure 9.




Figure 9 Overview of Value Focused Thinking [16:24]

In VFT, values are made explicit with objectives, and a hierarchical representation of objectives is constructed. The lower level objectives support the general objectives above them [8]. The objectives provide guidance for action and the foundation for analysis [16:33].

An objective is a statement of something that one wants to achieve. Three features characterize it: a decision context, an object, and a direction of preference. There are two types of objectives: fundamental objectives and means objectives. A fundamental objective states the essential reason for interest in the decision, a basis for

considering the decision. A means objective is the means to the achievement of the fundamental objectives; it implies the degree to which another objective can be achieved [16:34].

### Value Model

A value model is the representation of the decision maker's objectives, tasks, subtasks, attributes, and scoring functions. The value model indicates the important information so alternatives can be evaluated more credibly. A value model is a branching structure, with the most fundamental objectives appearing at the top. Keeney states, "The higher-level objective is defined by the set of lower-level objectives directly under it in the hierarchy" [16:78]. Figure 10 shows the basic format for a value hierarchy.




Figure 10 Value Model

A value model is a model with qualitative and quantitative relationships. The general procedure for building this model is essentially the same as for any model; principles, sound logic, reasoned judgments, and consistent data. The intent is to have the model lend some insight into a complex situation [16:130].

Clemens describes six specific characteristics of a value model: 1. complete, encompassing all important facets of the decision; 2. as small as possible; 3. objectives should only appear once; 4. objectives should be decomposable, and stand alone; 5. means and fundamental objectives should be distinguished; and 6. attribute scales must provide an easy way to measure performance or outcomes [6:533-534]. Combining the first, third, and fourth characteristics above yields two properties: the objectives must be mutually exclusive (only appear once and can be treated separately) and collectively exhaustive (encompass all that the decision maker values) [8]. Likewise, Kirkwood says that a value model should have the following characteristics: 1. evaluation considerations must adequately cover all concerns necessary to evaluate the overall objective; 2. non-redundancy: no two evaluation considerations should overlap; 3. evaluation considerations must be independent [17:16-18].

Attributes are metrics used to gauge system performance. Each attribute has a range, from worst to best. The metric is a measuring tool for determining to what degree an objective is achieved. An attribute should be measurable, operational, and understandable. Attributes that have those three properties will clarify the respective objectives and facilitate value-focused thinking. A critical issue affecting whether an attribute has those properties is ambiguity. Each attribute should be unambiguous, i.e. have a clear meaning. An attribute that is measurable explains the associated objective in more detail than the objective alone. It is operational if it describes the possible consequences of the associated objective and provides a basis for measuring the various degrees to which the objective might be achieved. To be understandable, there should be

no ambiguity in describing consequences and in interpreting consequences described in terms of attributes [16:100-116].

Value Function. The numerical rating that a decision alternative obtains with respect to a particular evaluation measure is called the score of an alternative [17:11-13]. The scoring function, provides a quantitative way to measure the performance of an alternative for each attribute. The value function is used to convert the scores into something meaningful to the decision maker. It is used to evaluate the performance of the alternative. The domain (horizontal axis) of the value function represents the attribute; the range (vertical axis) is the corresponding value score. A value function's domain may be quantitative or qualitative and may be different, but its range must be quantitative and the same. The development of these functions is an important task. Analysts must determine the decision makers' values for the full range of the attribute [8].

There are many types of value functions. One of the simplest is the linear value function. A linear function implies that each incremental increase in performance is valued just as much as the preceding increment [8]. It has the advantages of easy construction and computation. However, in many cases it is not warranted. For example, the value of an incremental increase in performance may be valued less than the preceding increment, known as diminishing marginal returns. Jackson says, "Another way of explaining diminishing returns is to say that some level of performance is 'good enough'" [8].

Another function used is increasing marginal returns, where an incremental increase in performance is valued more than the preceding increment. In this case

Jackson says, "the decision maker admits there is a certain threshold of performance that must be met before the system has substantive value" [8].

The S-curve function, which reflects a combination of the two previous examples of increasing returns then diminishing returns, is another value function used. The four examples given are the most common value functions; however, as Jackson states, "as long as the objective is to maximize value, any monotonically increasing representation is possible" [8].

Kirkwood provides a mathematical equation for an exponential single dimensional value function. This exponential function has a particular form that depends on the range of the measure and a constant called the exponential constant. This constant specifies the shape of the curve, thus allowing the marginal or diminishing returns. As the value of the constant increases, the graph will become less curved until finally the function becomes a straight line. When the constant is infinitely large, the function is exactly a straight line [17:65]. The following equations are Kirkwoods' exponential single dimensional value function, where  $\rho$  is the exponential constant and the high and low terms specify the range of the measure being evaluated.

The equation (1) is for monotonically increasing functions where the higher amounts of  $x$  are preferred to lower amounts. The equation (2) is for monotonically decreasing where the lower amounts of  $x$  are preferred to higher amounts [17:65-66].

$$v(x) = \begin{cases} \frac{1 - \exp[-(x - Low)/\rho]}{1 - \exp[-(High - Low)/\rho]}, & \rho \neq \text{Infinity} \\ \frac{x - Low}{High - Low}, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (1)$$

$$v(x) = \begin{cases} \frac{1 - \exp[-(High - x)/\rho]}{1 - \exp[-(High - Low)/\rho]}, & \rho \neq \text{Infinity} \\ \frac{High - x}{High - Low}, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (2)$$

Weights. The next step is to assign weights to the different levels of the value hierarchy, thus showing the relative importance. There are several ways to assess the weights. Clemens suggests three different methods: pricing out, swing weighting and lottery weights. Pricing out is essentially determining the marginal rate of substitution between one attribute and any other, trying to find an indifference point. This technique becomes difficult to use when comparing two attributes with different value function types. Swing Weighting requires the decision maker to compare individual attributes directly by imagining hypothetical outcomes and swinging each attribute from its least preferred to its most preferred level. This technique can be used in almost any weight-assessment situation, but requires a lot of thought. The third type discussed is lottery weights. Lottery weights assess the probability that makes one indifferent between a lottery and the sure thing. The assessment is the weight for the one odd attribute in the sure thing [6:546-550]. The third type is not applicable since we aren't assessing probabilities.

The weights are assigned to the value hierarchy across each tier. They range between 0 and 1. For each task, the weights of the immediate subtasks must sum to 1.00. Figure 11 shows an example of weights assigned to a value model.




Figure 11 Value Model with Assigned Weights

Additive Value Function. If there are no interactions (mutual independence) among a set of attributes, a simple additive value function can be used to calculate a total score for an alternative. The additive utility function is  $V(x_1, \dots, x_m) = k_1 V_1(x_1) + \dots + k_m V_m(x_m)$  where the weights are  $k_1, \dots, k_m$ ,  $x_i$  is the score of the attribute, and  $V_i$  is the value function of the attribute [6:537].

After the value model is completed and weights have been assigned, the evaluation of alternatives can be accomplished. For each alternative, raw scores are evaluated using the applicable value functions. If a particular attribute does not apply to the alternative, the raw score is zero and hence the value of that attribute is 0. A total value is found by using the additive utility function. The alternative with the highest value is the “best” [8].

Vulnerability Set Value Evaluation. When an alternative is comprised of several components, as is the case of a vulnerability set, a way to calculate the overall value for the set is needed. There are several ways to approach calculating the vulnerability set value. One method of calculating the value is simply to take an average of the score for each component for each attribute and then apply the appropriate value functions. Another approach would be to take the individual component scores, apply the appropriate value functions, and then take the average of the values. Using the maximum or minimum score for the alternative would be another approach.

There are a large number of potential methods of evaluating the value of a vulnerability set. There are no known efforts that have explicitly studied which approach is the correct approach. For this research the method used averages the scores for each component and then applies the appropriate value function.

### **Network Modeling Tools**

There are many algorithms and modeling tools for network analysis. The problem is finding one that satisfies the analysis requirements for the specific network at hand. Many of the network modeling tool's primary focus is communication or computer networks. For example, a computer program called Adversary is used at the National Air Intelligence Center (NAIC) for modeling communication networks. It is a great tool complete with graphical images; however, it is designed for a communication network. The program can be used to model different aspects of a communication network, but the



current version does not find cut-sets of the network. Therefore, it would be hard to find all the vulnerabilities of a network.

Another network analysis tool is called “NetWorker”. This software was developed in Visual Basic and incorporates a graphical user interface (GUI) to display the network. The GUI is used to modify the network and then save it as a text file readable by the analysis algorithm [15]. However, one of the inputs was traffic demand. Additional information could not be obtained on whether or not this program was communication specific or if it could be used for any type of network. In addition, there was no information on the types of analysis the software is capable of doing.

Other network analysis tools include, but are not limited to: Tahoe Design Software for a pumps and fluid network [30]; Splice [12] and ESACAP [13] for an electrical circuit network; Novell’s LANalyzer [25] and ODS Networks [26] for a computer network; NetSense [24] for internet analysis; Model Quest [21] and Brain Maker [5] for neuro networks; OPNET [23] for communication networks; and KrackPlot [19] for social networks. These are just a few of the many network modeling tools available today. However, there were no tools found that could model a generic multi-disciplined network and perform analysis to determine critical vulnerabilities of the network.

### Cut-Set Algorithms

After researching various communication and computer network modeling tools, the focus changed to finding graph theory algorithms to generate cut-sets of a graph.

Like network modeling tools, there are a number of cut-set algorithms available for use. Hao developed “A faster algorithm for finding the minimum cut in a directed graph” [14:424]. This algorithm finds the minimum cut of a directed network without even specifying a source or sink node, and can easily be applied to undirected networks by replacing each undirected arc with two directed arcs. The algorithm finds the minimum cut for a network of nodes and arcs, where each arc of the network has an associated capacity.

Provan and Shier developed “A Paradigm for Listing (s,t)-Cuts in Graphs” [28:351]. An (s,t)-cut is a set which when removed disconnects a node s and a node t. An (s,t)-cutset is the minimal cut that does not contain any other cut. The paradigm can be used in a variety of graph types and has a time-per-cut complexity that is linear in the size of the graph.

Network Disruption Modeling Tool. Patvardhan, Prasad, and Pyara developed an algorithm for finding the vertex cut-sets of undirected graphs. The algorithm finds all s-t minimal vertex cut-sets separating two vertices, s and t [27]. This algorithm was used by Leinart to develop the Network Disruption Modeling Tool. Leinart’s model not only generates cut-sets of a network but it also incorporates a tool for ranking the cut-sets using Value Focused Thinking [20].

Leinart uses the Patvardhan, Prasad, and Pyara algorithm to generate the cut-sets of a network. Leinart expanded the algorithm to find the vertex and link cut-sets for a network. He uses a transformation of a graph to represent the links as vertices and then applies the algorithm.

The cut-sets that are generated using the algorithm are then ranked using a value model developed using Value Focused Thinking techniques. The model is written in a Visual Basic/Excel Spreadsheet environment. Leinart's model, the Network Disruption Modeling Tool, is used to find and rank all the target sets of an enemy's communication network [20]. However, Leinart's model focuses on an undirected network, which would generate more cut-sets than needed in a directed network. In addition, only one source and one sink could be selected. In Space Command one network could include multiple sources and/or multiple sinks. The tool also requires code to be changed if a decision maker wants to change the values. Leinart's model is applied to a communication network with no sub-network interaction. The model does have the capability to rank the cut-sets using Value Focused Thinking. This model was the only model found which not only could find a cut-set but also already included a model to rank them [20].

*Network Vulnerability Assessment Tool.* The cut-set algorithm selected for this thesis effort was developed from MAXFLO, a program written in Fortran for Stochastic Network Performance analysis[1:3-1]. The program uses the concept of flow in a network. The information flows through capacitated arcs and nodes. In addition, the loss of an arc or node is equivalent to setting the capacity of the respective arc or node equal to 0 [1:3-4]. Thus a cut-set would consist of a path whose capacity is equal to 0.

Although the networks discussed in this thesis are not necessarily capacitated, this algorithm can be used to identify cut-sets by initially setting all node and arc capacities to 1. This allows each node and arc to be capacitated and set to 0 to disconnect them from the network.

In order to input the topology of the network into the *Network Vulnerability Assessment Tool* the network must be labeled using integers starting with one as the source. For the case of multiple source nodes, the first number of the network is reserved as a dummy node, where the actual source node follows the dummy node. Similarly the last number(s) are reserved for multiple sink node(s) followed by an additional number created for a dummy sink node. "Arcs are referred to by the source node integer called the Tail and the destination node integer called the Head" [1:3-11].

The algorithm by Shier and Whited used by Bailey provides a way to calculate cut-sets from pathsets by inversion [29]. As Bailey pointed out, "the best way to describe the algorithm is by an example network given in the article by Shier and Whited" [1:3-13]. The network is shown in Figure 12.




Figure 12 Directed Network with paths

A path polynomial is written as

$$X_1X_4 + X_2X_3X_4 + X_2X_5$$

where  $X_1 X_4$ ,  $X_2 X_3 X_4$ , and  $X_2 X_5$  are path sets of the network. Therefore there are three paths from the source (s) to the sink (t). The inverse polynomial is obtained by complementing the polynomial giving

$$(X_1+X_4)(X_2+X_3+X_4)(X_2+X_5).$$

“If the inverse polynomial is expanded and the non-minimal elements are deleted, the result is the cut-set polynomial” [29]. Thus the next step is to expand the first two terms giving

$$(X_1X_2+X_1X_3+X_1X_4+X_1X_2+X_1X_3+X_1X_4+X_4X_2+X_4X_3+X_4X_4)(X_2+X_5).$$

Next delete any elements that are contained in another element and eliminate duplicates giving

$$(X_1X_2+X_1X_3+X_1X_4+X_4X_2+X_4X_3+X_4)(X_2+X_5).$$

Finally expand the remaining elements and perform the same reduction techniques:

$$(X_1X_2X_2+X_1X_2X_5+X_1X_3X_2+X_1X_3X_5+X_1X_4X_2+X_1X_4X_5 \\ +X_4X_2X_2+X_4X_2X_5+X_4X_3X_2+X_4X_3X_5+X_4X_2+X_4X_5).$$

Since  $X_4X_2$  is contained in the 5<sup>th</sup>, 7<sup>th</sup>, 8<sup>th</sup>, and 9<sup>th</sup> terms,  $X_4X_5$  is contained in the 6<sup>th</sup>, 8<sup>th</sup>, and 10<sup>th</sup> terms, and  $X_1X_2$  is contained in the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> terms, the equation is reduced to

$$(X_1X_2+X_1X_3X_5+X_4X_2+X_4X_5),$$

which is the cut-set polynomial. Thus the network has four cut-sets:  $X_1X_2$ ,  $X_1X_3X_5$ ,  $X_4X_2$ , and  $X_4X_5$ .

The cut-sets that are generated using the Shier and Whited algorithm are then ranked using a value model developed using Value Focused Thinking techniques, similar

to what Leinart [20] used. This new technique has the ability to find vulnerability sets in a directed network with any number of sources and sinks. In addition, it uses a value model to rank the vulnerabilities.

## **Summary**

The theory presented in this chapter establishes the concepts used for this research effort. The key points that should be noted are: 1) the vulnerability of a network is the disruption of elements in the network; 2) graph theory can be used to represent and analyze a network, finding cut-sets of the network; 3) value focused thinking can then be used to rank the cut-sets by using a value model to represent a decision makers values; and 4) many network modeling tools are available, however, the key is to find the one that best models and analyzes the network of interest. The next chapter uses these concepts to develop a methodology for analyzing the multi-disciplined network of interest.

### **III. Methodology**

#### **Background**

This research uses a graph theory approach to portray a multi-discipline network. The network components are represented as nodes and links of a graph. A Network Vulnerability Assessment Tool is used to analyze the network's vulnerabilities. The first step identifies what makes a link or node critical and then assesses the links and nodes. A value model is developed to assess the criticality of links and nodes. Specifically, the value model determines the relative importance of the vulnerabilities. The model is implemented in the Network Vulnerability Assessment Tool. Figure 13 shows the steps of the methodology, the models that are used at each step, and the outputs of each step. The methodology starts with the configuration of the network to be analyzed and ends with a prioritized list of network and sub-network vulnerabilities. Each step is accomplished in an Excel spreadsheet environment. The Network Vulnerability Assessment Tool was developed using Leinart's Network Disruption Modeling Tool [20] as a basis. A new cut-set algorithm has been incorporated to give the capability of analyzing a directed network with the possibility of multiple sources and/or sinks. Other modifications to the program have added the capabilities discussed throughout the methodology, including the sub-network routine.




Figure 13 Flow Chart of Methodology

### Network Configuration

The methodology begins by defining the configuration of the network to be analyzed. This configuration describes each component of the network, including all links and nodes. The topology of the network is inserted into the model by the user. The user specifies how many nodes are in the network, whether the source or sink is a dummy node which allows the use of multiple sources and sinks, and the links by specifying the



tail and head of each. In addition, the characteristics of each component are input. The characteristics are used later in the value model.

To illustrate a network configuration, an example is presented. Figure 14 is a graphical representation of the network topology of a generic network.




Figure 14 Generic Network Topology

The topology can be input into the Network Vulnerability Assessment Tool for further analysis. The total number of nodes is specified as 12. The source and sink nodes 1 and 12 respectively are not dummy nodes, and are entered as such. The links are then individually entered into the model. For example, the link from 1 to 7 is input into the model as 1 being the tail of the arc and 7 being the head of the arc. Similarly, the rest of the links are entered.

Now that the network topology has been represented, the specific characteristics of each link and node must be defined. As an example, the example network shown is defined as the network of nodes and links used to make breakfast, specifically oatmeal and toast. The nodes will represent the stove, refrigerator, sink, cooked meal, store, etc. The links represent the movement of something, for example, the movement of the butter from the store to the refrigerator. The entire description of the sample network and the characteristics of each node and link are shown in Appendix B.

The characteristics of the network are input into an Excel spreadsheet using the Visual Basic interface. The Excel environment is used to establish a source to store and organize the data of the network.

Finding a cut-set in the making breakfast scenario would provide little value to the analysis due to the nature of links. Each link could potentially be a vulnerability that would disrupt the network. Combining links or nodes into a cut-set would only give the impression that several links would have to be eliminated instead of just one to disrupt the network. Due to the insignificance of finding a cut-set in the making breakfast scenario, the generic network will be the focus in the next step of the methodology, cut-set generation.

### **Cut-set Generation**

This step involves identifying the vulnerability sets. A cut-set algorithm written in visual basic and implemented in the Network Vulnerability Assessment Tool performs the cut-set generation. The cut-sets are defined as vulnerability sets.

The Network Vulnerability Assessment Tool uses the inversion method, discussed in the previous chapter, to generate the cut-sets. The algorithm uses the network topology and determines all the path-sets of the network. It then inverts the path-sets which generates the cut-sets of the network. These cut-sets are identified as the vulnerability sets.

As an example, the generic network in Figure 14 is defined as a directed graph,  $G(12,21)$  with 12 vertices and 21 edges. If vertex 1 and 12 are designated as the source and sink (the two nodes between which disruption is desired) then the Network Disruption Modeling Tool generates 352 vulnerability sets, and seven paths.

Table 1 Vulnerability Sets for Generic Network

Vulnerability Set 1	Link 1 to 4	Link 1 to 6	Link 1 to 7	Node 9
Vulnerability Set 2	Link 1 to 6	Link 1 to 7	Node 4	Node 9
Vulnerability Set 3	Link 1 to 4	Link 1 to 6	Link 1 to 7	Link 9 to 12
Vulnerability Set 4	Link 1 to 6	Link 1 to 7	Node 4	Link 9 to 12
Vulnerability Set 5	Link 1 to 6	Link 1 to 7	Link 4 to 10	Node 9
Vulnerability Set 6	Link 1 to 6	Link 1 to 7	Link 4 to 10	Link 9 to 12
Vulnerability Set 7	Link 1 to 4	Link 1 to 7	Node 6	Node 9
Vulnerability Set 8	Link 1 to 7	Node 4	Node 6	Node 9
Vulnerability Set 9	Link 1 to 4	Link 1 to 7	Node 6	Link 9 to 12
Vulnerability Set 10	Link 1 to 7	Node 4	Node 6	Link 9 to 12
Vulnerability Set 11	Link 1 to 7	Link 4 to 10	Node 6	Node 9
Vulnerability Set 12	Link 1 to 7	Link 4 to 10	Node 6	Link 9 to 12
Vulnerability Set 13	Link 1 to 4	Link 1 to 7	Link 6 to 10	Node 9
Vulnerability Set 14	Link 1 to 7	Node 4	Link 6 to 10	Node 9
Vulnerability Set 15	Link 1 to 4	Link 1 to 7	Link 6 to 10	Link 9 to 12
Vulnerability Set 16	Link 1 to 7	Node 4	Link 6 to 10	Link 9 to 12
Vulnerability Set 17	Link 1 to 7	Link 4 to 10	Link 6 to 10	Node 9
Vulnerability Set 18	Link 1 to 7	Link 4 to 10	Link 6 to 10	Link 9 to 12
Vulnerability Set 19	Link 1 to 7	Node 9	Node 10	
Vulnerability Set 20	Link 1 to 7	Link 9 to 12	Node 10	

The vulnerability sets are a complete collection of the minimal set of vertices and/or edges, whose removal from the network will divide the network into two sub-graphs, with vertex 1 in one component and vertex 12 in the other. Twenty of the vulnerability

sets are shown in Table 1. The vulnerability sets are used in the value model to prioritize and generate the most vulnerable sets of the network.

### Vulnerability Set Evaluation

Value-Focused Thinking [16] is used to prioritize the vulnerability sets, which were generated using the cur-set algorithm. First a value model is selected or defined using existing Air Force documents and/or a decision maker's values. The value model is a working value hierarchy to determine the objective(s). The hierarchy is structured down to measurable attributes that adequately define each objective. Assigned weights indicate each attribute's relative importance within the hierarchy. The vulnerability sets are then ranked using the value model. The final result generates a prioritized vulnerability list.




Figure 15 Value Process

## Value Model Development

The value model is used to rank or score the vulnerability sets. In order to correctly and efficiently rank a vulnerability set several characteristics of the nodes and links need to be known. But even before characteristics are assessed, the fundamental objective(s) must be stated.

As mentioned in the introduction chapter, Air Force Doctrine states that the objective is to gain and maintain space control. As was further discussed, USCINSPACE has several objectives to achieve space control. One of those objectives is to “protect our critical space systems from hostile actions” [9:20]. This seems to be the focus throughout several space documents such as Air Force Doctrine Document 2-2 [11], Space Command’s Long Range Plan [9], and the Space Handbook: A War Fighter’s Guide to Space [10]. In addition, counterspace is mentioned as a means of gaining and maintaining this control. Counterspace is then broken down into offensive and defensive actions. Figure 16 shows several characteristics of those actions used to control space.

The defensive aspect is the primary focus. Defensive counterspace may either be active or passive. Passive counterspace defense is the area of interest in this research effort. Passive defense is broken down into two categories in Air Force Doctrine Document 2-2: reduce vulnerabilities, and, protect and increase survivability. The next step in finding the fundamental objective is to reduce this even further, focusing in on reducing vulnerabilities.




Figure 16 Space Control Characteristics

There are several steps to gaining space control by reducing vulnerabilities. Figure 17 shows a logical flow of reducing vulnerabilities. In order to reduce the vulnerability, the vulnerability must be known, assessed, and fixed. Passive defense starts with understanding allied networks and finding the weak links. Modifying the weak links allow the survivability of the network to be increased. Using a value model, the vulnerabilities can be ranked to find the most critical to the network.

Another viewpoint is also important to consider. For example, what is the objective of an adversary? The adversary wants to deny, disrupt, or destroy the network. The goal is to find the vulnerabilities of the network that could pose as the adversary's potential targets. This will help in protecting assets from hostile threats.




Figure 17 Vulnerability Analysis

Before finding and assessing the vulnerability of a network structure, the network requirements need to be clearly stated and understood. Several sources provide guidance in this area and are shown below. “The battle space information system...will provide: A redundant, seamless network of cross service and interagency links; Secure, and responsive...; Accurate and timely...” [9:10]. The space network should be an uninterrupted flow of information [9:10]. The network of space assets must have the capability to be reconstituted and repaired within days, or even hours [9:3]. The space systems include capabilities that are real-time, survivable, and enduring [10:84]. “Due to emerging threats to space assets; it is critical to maintain redundancy among terrestrial and space systems” [11:19]. In addition, a network should be robust, flexible, and sustainable [9:21-24].

Using the requirements of the system, a value hierarchy is constructed. The vulnerability value consists of items that could cause a system to be vulnerable or indestructible. It incorporates the key characteristics of the network system. In addition, it includes characteristics which would cause the network to be susceptible to disruption. For example, a network with no physical defense would be susceptible, or 'easy' to disrupt. Figure 18 shows a possible value hierarchy, with operability, survivability, and flexibility as key objectives. It is then further broken down into the characteristics of a space network as discussed earlier, with a few additions.




Figure 18 Value Hierarchy

Functionality determines the effects of a stressed environment to the network. Flexibility is the ability to adapt to a stressed environment under duress. Survivability is the ability to perform in a stressed environment during duress. These objectives or goals are used to score the vulnerability sets. The sets are ranked according to its criticality to the operation of the network. Network operation provides a key feature for space control. A detailed explanation of the value hierarchy is found in Appendix A.



### Vulnerability Set Value Model Evaluation

Once the objectives and goals have been defined and a value hierarchy has been constructed, the Network Vulnerability Assessment Tool is used to evaluate the cut-sets. The vulnerability set's importance is obtained by scoring the set against each measure using an average of the score for each component in the set, then evaluating each score using the appropriate value function, and finally summing the weighted values. Each measure has an associated weight. The value of each measure is multiplied by the weight and "rolled-up" into the next layer of the hierarchy until the overall objective is reached. This produces the overall vulnerability score for the set of links and nodes. Equation 3 is the vulnerability set value function, where  $w_i$  is the weight of the evaluation measure,  $x_{ij}$  is the evaluation measure score for each component in the vulnerability set,  $s_{ij}$  is the evaluation measure scoring function for each component in the vulnerability set,  $V_i$  is the value function of the evaluation measure, and  $n$  is the number of components in the vulnerability set.

$$Value = \sum_i w_i V_i \left( \frac{\sum_j^n s_{ij}(x_{ij})}{n} \right) \quad (3)$$

The score of each measure is based on the characteristics of the network input into the model and the measure's value function. The value function is used to normalize the measures so an additive value function may be applied. A decision maker determines the value function for the network of interest and inputs the function into the Network Vulnerability Assessment Tool.

As an example of the value model, we use the breakfast preparation example. Each node and link is defined as a vulnerability set. In other words, if the stove is removed the network is disrupted. Similarly, if the movement of butter from the store to the refrigerator is removed the network is disrupted. The importance of each of the nodes and links, or vulnerability sets, to the network is of interest. Using the characteristics and weights of the network in Appendix B, the measures described in Appendix A, and simple linear value functions, scores for each node and link are assessed using Equation 3. The scores are ranked from highest to lowest, thus producing a prioritized list of the network vulnerabilities. The scores and prioritized list are shown in Appendix B. The decision maker can truncate the list of vulnerabilities, for greater manageability. The Network Vulnerability Assessment Tool allows the user (or decision maker) to define the size of the list.

### **Sub-Network Vulnerabilities**

A vulnerability list for the network is constructed based on the theory of cut-sets. However, many times in a network there are nodes or links that are not part of a cut-set that can disrupt the network. For example, a node that is part of a vulnerability set can be disrupted by loss of power. The loss of power can be caused by the disruption of a power supply unit. This power supply unit may not appear in the cut-sets generated. For example, a power supply unit in the local city could cause preparation of breakfast to be disrupted. Thus a technique to find vulnerabilities in the sub-networks must be generated.

There are several methods to approach this problem. The methodology presented for finding cut-sets using graph theory could be ignored and the entire network of links and nodes could be examined and ranked by the value model alone. The problem with this technique is quickly recognized in large networks. Every component is considered a vulnerability and must be examined. The next step is to figure out which of the components would actually disrupt the network. This could be a very tedious process.

Another approach is to find another cut-set algorithm that does not require the use of a source or sink node. It simply finds all possible cut-sets of the network, any vertex or edge that would separate the network into two components. This process would generate most of the vulnerabilities. However, if a node is attached to only one edge, the node itself will not be considered a cut-set. The definition of a cut-set does not allow for a single node to be considered a cut-set. This approach not only requires finding an algorithm that could generate such cut-sets, but also requires each node that is attached to only one edge be added or included in the analysis separately.

Using the Network Vulnerability Assessment Tool, a list of vulnerability sets could be generated using each node as a source and sink node, deleting any duplicates. The tool would be run in a loop until every node was a source and a sink. Using every node as the source and sink node would generate all possible cut-sets. This approach would include the links and nodes of a sub-network; however, the processing would be time consuming.

Based on availability, processing time, and compatibility with the Network Vulnerability Assessment Tool, the selected approach is now described. The decision

maker determines the manageable size of the vulnerability list produced by the modeling tool. Using this list, the nodes are extracted and any sub-networks are defined. Each node and link of the sub-networks becomes a possible vulnerability. Each is scored and ranked using the same value model techniques used in ranking the vulnerability sets. The Network Vulnerability Assessment Tool ranks all the sub-network components together. However, vulnerabilities of individual nodes can easily be extracted, giving a prioritized list for each critical node. For example, in Figure 14 node 3 and link 3 to 5 are considered sub-networks of node 5. During the scoring and ranking process, node 3 and link 3 to 5 will be ranked against one another. Node 12 and link 9 to 12 will be ranked against one another and assigned as a sub-network to node 9. These nodes and links will not be generated as a part of a cut-set unless the source or sink node is node 3 or node 12.

The sub-network vulnerability generation allows a decision maker to distinguish which components of sub-networks can effect the entire network. The components are listed according to which node they will effect in the network.

## **Summary**

The most vulnerable set of nodes and/or links of a network are generated using the Network Vulnerability Assessment Tool. This tool incorporates an algorithm that produces the cut-sets of the network of interest. The cut-sets are transformed to vulnerability sets and evaluated using a defined value model. The decision maker creates this value model using value focused thinking techniques. The total values are ranked from highest to lowest producing a prioritized list of vulnerability sets. The top

vulnerability sets are used to find sub-network vulnerabilities. The sub-network vulnerabilities are evaluated using a value model (possibly the same as the network itself) and value focus thinking techniques. Finally, the methodology is implemented in a Network Vulnerability Assessment Tool written in an Excel/Visual Basic environment. The methodology provides a systematic way of determining the most vulnerable components of a network.

## IV. Results and Analysis

This chapter presents analysis for a notional network using the methodology developed in the previous chapter. The analysis includes results obtained from the *Network Vulnerability Assessment Tool*.

### Network Vulnerability Assessment Tool

The *Network Vulnerability Assessment Tool* is a self-driven tool written in a Visual Basic/Excel environment. The tool is used to generate, score and rank the vulnerability sets and then perform sensitivity analysis, persistency analysis, and occurrence analysis. In addition, the tool provides a separate sheets for evalauting the sub-network components. The Visual Basic code for each step can be found in Appendix D Visual Basic Code.

### The Notional Network

The network presented in this chapter is a hypothetical representation of Air Force Space Commands (AFSPC) Ground-based Electro-Optical Deep Space Surveillance (GEODSS) sensor network. The notional network consists of eighteen nodes and twenty-seven links as shown in Figure 19. Node 1 and Node 20 represent a dummy source and a dummy sink respectively. Adding these nodes allows analysis of multiple sources and sinks. An assessment of the vulnerabilities, which would cause a disruption of data flow from nodes 2, 3, and 4 to nodes 18 and 19, is desired. Disrupting the data flow between these nodes would hypothetically cut off all deep space optical sensor data to AFSC and

Navy Space Command (NAVSPACECOM). Network components are described in Table 2 and Table 3. Network attribute data are listed in Appendix C Notional Network Data.




Figure 19 Notional Network

Table 2 GEODSS Network Nodes

Components	Description
Node 2	Socorro, New Mexico Optical Sensor
Node 3	Maui, Hawaii Optical Sensor
Node 4	Diego Garcia, British Indian Ocean Territories Optical Sensor
Node 5	Primary Router
Node 6	Primary Router
Node 7	Satellite
Node 8	Primary Router
Node 9	Primary Router
Node 10	Tertiary Router
Node 11	Optical Command Facility (OC3F) – Edwards Air Force Base
Node 12	Primary Router
Node 13	Peterson Air Force Base
Node 14	Shriever Air Force Base
Node 15	Secondary Router
Node 16	Colorado Springs Primary Router
Node 17	Tertiary Router
Node 18	Navy Space Command (NAVSPACE)
Node 19	Space Control Center - Cheyenne Mountain Air Station (CMAS)

Table 3 GEODSS Network Links

Component	Description
Link 2 to 5	Primary Data Line
Link 3 to 6	Primary Microwave Line
Link 3 to 7	Satellite Relay
Link 4 to 7	Satellite Relay
Link 4 to 8	Primary Microwave Line
Link 5 to 10	Tertiary Data Line
Link 5 to 11	Primary Data Line
Link 5 to 13	Secondary Data Line
Link 6 to 10	Tertiary Data Line
Link 6 to 11	Primary Data Line
Link 6 to 13	Secondary Data Line
Link 7 to 11	Satellite Relay
Link 7 to 14	Satellite Relay
Link 7 to 18	Satellite Relay
Link 8 to 9	Primary Data Line
Link 9 to 11	Primary Data Line
Link 9 to 13	Secondary Data Line
Link 10 to 18	Tertiary Data Line
Link 11 to 12	Primary Data Line
Link 11 to 15	Secondary Data Line
Link 11 to 17	Tertiary Data Line
Link 12 to 13	Primary Data Line
Link 13 to 16	Primary Data Line
Link 14 to 16	Secondary Data Line
Link 15 to 19	Secondary Data Line
Link 16 to 19	Primary Data Line
Link 17 to 18	Tertiary Data Line

In addition to the data flow network, the sub-network analysis is performed for nodes 2, 3, 4, 11, 18, and 19. This sub-network analysis includes power and water stations and respective supply lines to support the listed nodes. The sub-network components are described in Table 4. The sub-network attribute data are listed in Appendix C Notional Network Data.



Table 4 Sub-Network Components

Component	Description
<b>Node 2</b>	Socorro Optical Sensor
2P1	Socorro Power Station
2W1	Socorro Water Station
2W2	Socorro Water Station
Link 2P1 to 2	Socorro Power Line
Link 2W1 to 2W2	Socorro Water Line
Link 2W2 to 2	Socorro Water Line
<b>Node 3</b>	Maui Optical Sensor
3P1	Maui Power Station
3P2	Maui Power Station
Link 3P1 to 3P2	Maui Power Line
Link 3P2 to 3	Maui Power Line
<b>Node 4</b>	Diego Garcia Optical Sensor
4P1	Diego Garcia Power Station
4W1	Diego Garcia Water Station
Link 4P1 to 4	Diego Garcia Power Line
Link 4W1 to 4	Diego Garcia Water Line
<b>Node 11</b>	OC3F – Edwards AFB
11P1	Edwards AFB Power Station
Link 11P1 to 11	Edwards AFB Power Line
<b>Node 18</b>	NAVSPACE
18P1	NAVSPACE Power Station
18W1	NAVSPACE Water Station
Link 18P1 to 18	NAVSPACE Power Line
Link 18W1 to 18	NAVSPACE Water Line
<b>Node 19</b>	Cheyenne Mountain Air Station
19P1	CMAS Power Generator
19P2	Colorado Springs Power Station
19P3	Colorado Springs Power Station
19W1	Colorado Springs Water Station
19W2	CMAS Water Station
Link 19P1 to 19	CMAS Power Line
Link 19P2 to 19P3	Colorado Springs Power Line
Link 19P3 to 19	CMAS Power Line
Link 19W1 to 19W2	Colorado Springs Water Line
Link 19W2 to 19	CMAS Water Line

The primary objective of the GEODSS sensor network is to collect deep space object identification and metric position data. Nodes 2, 3, and 4 collect the data and transfer it to the Optical Command Facility (OC3F) at Edwards Air Force Base. The OC3F is represented as Node 11. This data is then sent to Peterson Air Force Base where

the space object identification (SOI) data is extracted. Peterson Air Force Base is represented as Node 13. Finally, the metric position data is sent to the Space Control Center (SCC) at Cheyenne Mountain Air Station (CMAS), represented as Node 19.

Secondary routes are available for the flow of data through the network. These secondary routes are made available by other routers and links in the network. In addition, NAVSPACECOM acts as the alternate SCC (ASCC) in case CMAS is unavailable. Therefore, to totally disrupt the network all paths must be cut off between nodes 2, 3 and 4, designated as the sources, and nodes 18 and 19, designated as the sinks. Due to both the primary and secondary routes and the alternate SSC, there are 24 paths from the sources to the sinks. Each one of these paths must be cut to disrupt the network flow. This disruption would in turn reduce the reliability of the network to zero. Reliability in this case is defined as one if there is at least one path from the source nodes to the sink nodes. If there is no longer a path between the source and sink, the networks reliability becomes zero. This causes the network to be inoperable.

Using the cut-set algorithm in the *Network Vulnerability Assessment Tool*, a list of possible ways to disrupt the network are found. For the notional network, the cut-set algorithm yields 34,285 cut-sets. The cut-sets represent the potential ways of reducing the reliability of the network to zero. In other words, there are 34,285 different ways of cutting off every path from the sources to the sinks. Thus, these cut-sets become potential vulnerabilities of the network. Appendix C Notional Network Data contains the top twenty vulnerability sets. The code used to generate the vulnerability sets is given in Appendix D Visual Basic Code.

The next step is to prioritize the vulnerability sets. The value model is used to evaluate and prioritize the 34,285 vulnerability sets.

## Value Model Results

The value model consists of a hypothetical multi-attribute value function structured from the decision maker's value hierarchy. This value function was developed using the methodology discussed in the previous chapter, beginning with the overall objective of space control. The value hierarchy was approved and reviewed by AFSPACECOM/DOIK. The final value hierarchy, along with its weights, is shown in Figure 20. The three major objectives defining network vulnerability are functionality, flexibility, and survivability. These three objectives are further divided into sub-objectives and finally attributes or evaluation measures. The hierarchy contains eight evaluation measures: criticality, impact time, ease of transport, repairable, redundancy, hardening, availability, and physical defense. A complete explanation of the objectives and measures is presented in Appendix A Value Hierarchy. However, it should be noted that the evaluation measure ease of transport was integrated into the sub-objective mobile due to only having a single evaluation measure under mobile.




Figure 20 Value Hierarchy

The value model is used for scoring and ranking the vulnerability sets. The attributes of each node and link are used to derive the score of each vulnerability set. Having determined the vulnerability sets' scores, the multi-objective value function is used to evaluate each vulnerability set.

Given the weights and evaluation measures, using Keeney's additive utility function discussed in the literature search, and using Equation 3, the multi-objective vulnerability set value function is:

$$Value = \sum_{i=1}^8 w_i V_i \left( \frac{\sum_{j=1}^n s_{ij}(x_{ij})}{n} \right) \quad (4)$$

where  $w_1=.3$ ,  $w_2=.2$ ,  $w_3=.06$ ,  $w_4=.14$ ,  $w_5=.072$ ,  $w_6=.048$ ,  $w_7=.054$ ,  $w_8=.126$ , and other terms are defined as in Equation 3.

The coefficients in the multi-objective value function are global weights. Global weights are calculated by multiplying the weight of the evaluation measure with the weights of objectives and sub-objectives which are above it in the hierarchy [6:557]. For example, the evaluation measure, criticality, has a local weight of 0.6, but a global weight of  $(0.6)*(0.5)=0.3$ , since the functionality objective has a local weight of 0.50. It is important to note that for evaluation purposes, the highest value any vulnerability set can obtain is one, and the lowest value is zero. This value range was determined from the single dimensional value functions discussed in Appendix A and the multi-objective vulnerability set value function shown above.

Table 5 Ranges for Evaluation Measures

Evaluation Measure	Range(low, high)
Criticality (average importance to network)	(3, 10)
Impact Time (average time to impact reliability of network)	(0, 120)
Ease of Transport (average transportability of components)	(2, 4)
Repairable (average repair time of components)	(12, 96)
Redundancy (average number of redundancies of a component)	(0, 2)
Hardening (average number of hardening techniques of components)	(0, 1)
Availability (average availability time of components)	(0.93, 0.99)
Physical Defense (average number of defense techniques of components)	(1, 5)

The range of scores for each evaluation measure are determined by averaging the component scores that comprise each vulnerability set and taking the high and low values for each evaluation measure. The ranges of component scores for each evaluation measure are shown in Table 5, while the ranges of scores of the vulnerability sets, resulting from analyzing the notional network, are shown in Table 6.

The values of the vulnerability sets are calculated, using the Visual Basic code shown in Appendix D, and the attributes of the nodes and links. The Visual Basic code uses Equations 1 and 2, Kirkwood's exponential value function equations. The value function domains used for each evaluation measure are the ranges of scores for each evaluation measure.

Each of the 34,285 vulnerability sets is evaluated against each evaluation measure and in accordance with the multi-objective value function, an overall assessment is

determined. The Visual Basic code used for evaluating the vulnerability sets and assessing the value is given in Appendix D Visual Basic Code.

Table 6 Ranges of Scores for Evaluation Measures

Evaluation Measure	Range(low, high)
Criticality (average importance to network)	(4.83, 9)
Impact Time (average time to impact reliability of network)	(24, 96)
Ease of Transport (average transportability of components)	(3, 4)
Repairable (average repair time of components)	(15.43, 72)
Redundancy (average number of redundancies of a component)	(0, 1.67)
Hardening (average number of hardening techniques of components)	(0, 0.5)
Availability (average availability time of components)	(0.94, 0.99)
Physical Defense (average number of defense techniques of components)	(1, 3.33)

All vulnerability sets are ranked using the vulnerability set value function. The ranked listing comprises the potential vulnerability sets for disrupting the network. Vulnerability sets 32750, 32752, and 32751 were ranked the highest with overall vulnerability set values of 0.87, 0.84, and 0.84 respectively, and vulnerability sets 33195, 33193, and 34069 had the lowest ranking with vulnerability set values of 0.30, 0.30, 0.29 respectively. Table 7 and Table 8 respectively show the highest and lowest ranking vulnerability sets along with their components.

Table 7 Highest Ranking Vulnerability Sets

Vulnerability Set 32750	Vulnerability Set 32752	Vulnerability Set 32751
Node 2: Socorro Optical Sensor Node 3: Maui Optical Sensor  Node 4: Diego Garcia Optical Sensor Value: 0.87	Node 3: Maui Optical Sensor Node 4: Diego Garcia Optical Sensor Node 5: Primary Router Value: 0.84	Link 2-5: Primary Data Line Node 3: Maui Optical Sensor  Node 4: Diego Garcia Optical Sensor Value: 0.84

Table 8 Lowest Ranking Vulnerability Sets

Vulnerability Set 33195	Vulnerability Set 33193	Vulnerability Set 34069
Link 7-14: Satellite Relay Link 7-18: Satellite Relay Node 10: Tertiary Router Link 13-16: Primary Data Line Node 15: Secondary Router Node 17: Tertiary Router Value: 0.30	Link 7-14: Satellite Relay Link 7-18: Satellite Relay Node 10: Tertiary Router Node 13: Peterson AFB Node 15: Secondary Router Node 17: Tertiary Router Value: 0.30	Link 7-18: Satellite Relay Node 10: Tertiary Router Node 17: Tertiary Router Node 19: Cheyenne Mountain AS Value: 0.29

In order to analyze the vulnerability sets in more detail, a reduced list of the potential vulnerability sets, containing the twenty sets of highest value, is created. This reduced list is shown in Appendix C Notional Network Data.

#### Value Composition

Figure 21 graphically represents the values of the top twenty vulnerability sets according to how much each major objective (top level of the hierarchy) in the hierarchy contributes to the overall vulnerability set value. The major objectives are functionality, flexibility, and survivability. Appendix C Notional Network Data provides a table showing the numerical values of each objective for the top twenty vulnerability sets. Figure 21 shows that the contribution of functionality stands out as the most important impact, followed by survivability. This is expected due to the weights given to each objective, with functionality at .50, flexibility at .20, and survivability at .30.




Figure 21 First Level Vulnerability Set Value Composition






Figure 22 Evaluation Measure Vulnerability Set Value Composition

(Note: As you read the legend from left to right, top to bottom, the corresponding evaluation measure is shown left to right in the graph.)

Figure 22 graphically represents the values of the vulnerability sets according to how much each evaluation measure (lowest level of the hierarchy) contributes to the overall set value. Appendix C Notional Network Data provides a table showing the numerical values of each measure for the top twenty vulnerability sets.

From Figure 22, criticality stands out as the most important, followed by impact time. Again, this is expected due to the weights given to each measure and the weights of their respective major objective and sub-objectives.

### One-way Sensitivity Analysis

In an effort to gain insight into the importance the weights have on the potential vulnerability sets, sensitivity analysis is conducted by swinging the weights for each evaluation measure. It is important to note that as an evaluation measure's weight approaches zero, that evaluation measure essentially becomes a non-player in the decision at hand. Similarly, a weight that approaches one makes the problem less of a decision analysis problem and more of an optimization effort for that evaluation measure. In this phase of the analysis, only the top five of the potential vulnerability sets are analyzed for sensitivity to changes in the objective and evaluation measure weights.

Figures 23 through 26 display the sensitivity of the five vulnerability set rankings to the weight of each objective and evaluation measure in the hierarchy. The base weights are shown as vertical broken lines. In addition, the figures display the points at which a vulnerability set drops below the top twenty ranked vulnerability sets. Appendix C Notional Network Data contains the data sets that are associated with each graph. A figure for each objective, sub-objective, and evaluation measure is not shown. This is due to the mirror image effects of evaluation measures or sub-objective under the same objective. For example, criticality is simply the mirror image of the impact time graph.

The figures show that the vulnerability sets are most sensitive to the major objectives of the hierarchy: functionality, flexibility, and survivability. As these weights are swung from 0 to 1 not only do the rankings of the top five vulnerability sets change, but most of the sets fall below the top twenty at some point. For example, in the case of survivability, set 25729 falls below the top twenty by increasing the weight from .3 to .5. In fact, the only time set 25729 falls within the top twenty sets is when the survivability weight is at a weight of .4 or below. Similarly, the ranking of the top five vulnerability sets changes in all three cases with a small decrease or increase in the weights.

The evaluation measure ease of transport is the only other graph that shows a vulnerability set dropping below the top twenty. However, the point where the set drops below the top twenty is six weight shifts away from the base value, which is not very likely to occur. As seen in Figure 26, Availability (and its complement physical defense) weight makes very little to the sets due to the fact that there is very little variation in scores for those attributes. Thus a variation in the weights associated with these evaluation measures would make no difference to the ranking of those sets. However, redundancy and its mirror image evaluation measure, hardening, have their base weights on a point at which a shift higher or lower would change the vulnerability set ranking. Therefore a variation in weight for these measures does make a difference to the overall ranking of the vulnerability sets. However, the top vulnerability set is unaffected by the variation in weights. The scores are shown in Appendix C Notional Network Data.

### Sensitivity Analysis

↑ Indicates a point where the vulnerability set drops below the top 20 sets  
Dashed line indicates the point at which the evaluation measure or objective is at its base weight




Figure 23 Functionality and Criticality Sensitivity Analysis

### Sensitivity Analysis

↑ Indicates a point where the vulnerability set drops below the top 20 sets  
Dashed line indicates the point at which the evaluation measure or objective is at its base weight





Figure 24 Flexibility and Ease of Transport Sensitivity Analysis

### Sensitivity Analysis

↑ Indicates a point where the vulnerability set drops below the top 20 sets  
Dashed line indicates the point at which the evaluation measure or objective is at its base weight





Figure 25 Survivability and Media Protection Sensitivity Analysis

### Sensitivity Analysis

↑ Indicates a point where the vulnerability set drops below the top 20 sets  
Dashed line indicates the point at which the evaluation measure or objective is at its base weight





Figure 26 Redundancy and Availability Sensitivity Analysis

Figures 23 and 25 show that the evaluation measures criticality and impact time and the sub-objectives media protection and physical endurance are not sensitive to the weights being varied. The 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> ranked sets do switch rankings in criticality and its complement, impact time, just beyond the base weights. However, none of the sets fall below the top twenty. Media protection and its complement, physical endurance, cause only the third ranked vulnerability set to the change as the weight changes. Therefore, further study should be done to verify these weights and determine which direction they might move.

Availability and its complement, physical defense, are the least sensitive evaluation measures. The vulnerability sets always remain in the top twenty. Neither measure causes the ranking of the vulnerability sets to change.

The sensitivity graphs give insight into how sensitive the vulnerability sets and their rankings are to changes in the objectives and evaluation measures' weighting. Further research into the certainty of the most sensitive evaluation measure's weight is certainly required in order to make the proper vulnerability set selection. A proper selection and prioritization of the vulnerability sets would allow a decision maker the opportunity to increase survivability, security, and maintain throughput of the network. In addition, due to possible budget or time constraints the entire set of vulnerabilities may not be examined. Thus a prioritized list is needed.



### Persistency Analysis

Additional analysis included component recurrence, or persistence. Leinart presented recurrence or persistence as how often the component is found in the top twenty vulnerability sets at the base weight [20:4-22]. Here persistency analysis is defined to be how often the component is found in the top twenty vulnerability sets as the weight of the evaluation measure or objective is swung from 0 to 1. Figures 27 through 30 show graphs of persistence for all the nodes and links in the top twenty vulnerability sets as the weights of the evaluation measures or objectives were swung from 0 to 1.

Again, functionality, flexibility, and survivability are the most sensitive to the change in weights. Not only does the number of times a node or link occurs in the top twenty change, but the total number of nodes and links change as the weight changes. As shown in Figure 29, media protection (and its complement, physical endurance) is sensitive to the change in weights. The base weight for media protection would have to increase to .8 and physical endurance drop to .2 before stabilization occurs. However, no new nodes or links are introduced in either sub-objective. Figure 30 shows availability and its complement, physical defense, are most sensitive as availability decreases and physical defense increases. Ease of transport and its complement, repairable, are very sensitive as ease of transport increases to approximately .6 and repairable decreases to .4, as seen in Figure 28.

### Persistency Analysis

Dashed line indicates the point at which the evaluation measure or objective is at its base weight





Figure 27 Functionality and Criticality Persistency Analysis

### Persistency Analysis

Dashed line indicates the point at which the evaluation measure or objective is at its base weight





Figure 28 Flexibility and Ease of Transport Persistency Analysis

### Persistency Analysis

Dashed line indicates the point at which the evaluation measure or objective is at its base weight





Figure 29 Survivability and Media Protection Persistency Analysis

### Persistency Analysis

Dashed line indicates the point at which the evaluation measure or objective is at its base weight





Figure 30 Redundancy and Availability Persistency Analysis

The evaluation measures criticality and impact time are the least sensitive in the persistency analysis to the change in weights. There is small variation in the persistency; however, no new nodes or links are introduced into the top twenty in either case. It is also important to note that Node 3 remains the most persistent component throughout the analysis except in the functionality objective, where it drops as the weight is increased to .8, which is unlikely since this is several increments from the base weight. Clearly, Node 3 is an important component of the network that may require further analysis.

Figure 31 shows the percent occurrence of each node and link in all vulnerability sets. For example, Node 2 occurs in vulnerability sets approximately 19% of the time. In other words, 19% of all 34,285 vulnerability sets will contain Node 2. As shown in Figure 31, Node 15 occurs in approximately 27% of the sets and Link 7 to 18 occurs in approximately 50% of the sets, and are the most recurring node and link respectively. In addition, Node 12 and Node 17 are closely behind at 24%, as well as Link 5 to 13 and Link 6 to 13 at 35%. These nodes and links could pose a potential threat due to the number of times it occurs in a vulnerability set. Thus further analysis of these nodes and links is suggested.





Figure 31 Node and Link Occurrence Charts

### Sub-Network Analysis

As was stated earlier, Nodes 2, 3, 4, 11, 18, and 19 were used to perform sub-network analysis. The sub-network components represent the power and water resources necessary to operate the respective sites. The components and attribute data are listed in Appendix C Notional Network Data.

Using the same value hierarchy and the sub-network attribute data, shown in Appendix C, a ranked listing of sub-network vulnerabilities is assessed. Each component of the sub-network is scored and evaluated using the appropriate value function. Using

Equation 4 the value can be assessed. However, in this case  $n=1$  and there is no need to average individual component scores. Instead the score of the component is directly input into the value function.

Table 9 shows the ranked list of sub-network components for each node analyzed. Using the hypothetical value hierarchy, we can conclude that the most effective way to take out Node 2 is to destroy the node itself. This is a result of the impact time and criticality of the component. In addition, the power station, which is the next ranked vulnerability for Node 2, is shown to have a redundancy in the attribute data (see Appendix C). The node is determined to have a backup power generator. In the case of Node 18, the most effective way to disrupt the node is to destroy the water station. This is due to the low value for the criticality evaluation measure and the fact that both the node itself and the power resources included a redundancy.

Using the information in Table 9 and the previous persistency data, one can conclude that Node 3 is the most vulnerable node and the most effective way to disrupt that node is to destroy the node itself or its power station. This data can be used to identify individual vulnerabilities, thus allowing a decision maker to focus in on the most vulnerable components of the network or make informed decisions considering susceptibility. This focus allows the decision maker to make protection plans and expend the budget in a prioritized manner.



Table 9 Sub-Network Vulnerability Ranking

Components	Description	Value
<b>Node 2</b>	<b>Socorro Optical Sensor</b>	<b>0.73</b>
2P1	Socorro Power Station	0.56
Link 2P1 to 2	Socorro Power Line	0.55
2W1	Socorro Water Station	0.36
2W2	Socorro Water Station	0.35
Link 2W1 to 2W2	Socorro Water Line	0.28
Link 2W2 to 2	Socorro Water Line	0.28
<b>Node 3</b>	<b>Maui Optical Sensor</b>	<b>0.83</b>
3P1	Maui Power Station	0.73
Link 3P1 to 3P2	Maui Power Line	0.65
3P2	Maui Power Station	0.64
Link 3P2 to 3	Maui Power Line	0.58
<b>Node 4</b>	<b>Diego Garcia Optical Sensor</b>	<b>0.72</b>
4P1	Diego Garcia Power Station	0.64
Link 4P1 to 4	Diego Garcia Power Line	0.62
4W1	Diego Garcia Water Station	0.32
Link 4W1 to 4	Diego Garcia Water Line	0.28
<b>Node 11</b>	<b>OC3F – Edwards AFB</b>	<b>0.68</b>
Link 11P1 to 11	Edwards AFB Power Line	0.62
11P1	Edwards AFB Power Station	0.60
<b>Node 18</b>	<b>NAVSPACE</b>	<b>0.28</b>
18W1	NAVSPACE Water Station	0.35
Link 18W1 to 18	NAVSPACE Water Line	0.32
Link 18P1 to 18	NAVSPACE Power Line	0.31
18P1	NAVSPACE Power Station	0.29
<b>Node 19</b>	<b>SCC - Cheyenne Mountain Air Station (CMAS)</b>	<b>0.74</b>
19W1	Colorado Springs Water Station	0.70
19P3	Colorado Springs Power Station	0.66
19P2	Colorado Springs Power Station	0.65
Link 19P2 to 19P3	Colorado Springs Power Line	0.61
Link 19W1 to 19W2	Colorado Springs Water Line	0.61
Link 19P3 to 19	CMAS Power Line	0.59
19W2	CMAS Water Station	0.57
19P1	CMAS Power Generator	0.55
Link 19P1 to 19	CMAS Power Line	0.55
Link 19W2 to 19	CMAS Water Line	0.50

### Summary

Given the hypothetical network of GEODSS sensors, a list of potential vulnerability sets was determined. In addition, a final list of the highest ranking

vulnerability sets was analyzed using a hypothetical value model established from a combination of Space Command resources discussed in the methodology chapter.

Sensitivity analysis was then conducted on the five vulnerability sets with the highest vulnerability value. This sensitivity analysis identified functionality, flexibility, survivability, repairable, and ease of transport as critical in assessing the rankings of the vulnerability sets. Further study in the uncertainty of the weights for these objectives and evaluation measures should be conducted.

Persistency analysis suggested that the sub-objectives media protection and physical endurance should be included in further studies. This analysis focused on individual components instead of the vulnerability sets. In addition, the occurrence data provided a means for determining which nodes and links occurred more often in the vulnerability sets.

Sub-network analysis was then conducted on several nodes to show how an individual node could be disrupted by other means. The analysis provided a ranked list of sub-network components that could disrupt the entire network by disrupting the associated node. Again, changes in the value model could change the outcome of the rankings. Thus it is very important to establish a valid working value model.

## **V. Conclusions and Recommendations**

This chapter provides conclusions from the analysis completed and makes recommendations for further related research.

### **Overview**

This effort accomplished the goal of providing a tool and methodology for generating vulnerabilities of a network and a quantitative method to determine the value for ranking the vulnerabilities. The ranking achieves the overall objective of finding the most vulnerable components of a network which could reduce the reliability of the network from one to zero as the number of paths in the network goes from one or more to zero. In addition, the methodology allows sub-network vulnerabilities, such as water or power lines, to be identified. The Network Vulnerability Assessment Tool assists in implementing the methodology for evaluating a network. Additionally, the tool provides a means to graphically display and provide insight into the driving factors behind the scores used for ranking the vulnerabilities. This can assist the decision maker in determining the appropriate value weights.

### **Research Results**

The analysis conducted on the notional network was used to illustrate the concepts of generating network vulnerability sets, measuring these sets to nominate the most vulnerable set, evaluating the driving factors, and analyzing sub-network vulnerabilities. The methodology allows the tool to be applied to a variety of network

types and sub-networks. The tool allows for the value structure to be adjusted to reflect the realities of an actual network and its decision maker's values.

The value model presents an examination of the important factors involved in the decision of ranking the vulnerabilities based on knowledge, experience, and objectives of the decision maker. As the notional network showed, the method contributes a means to evaluate any network and its sub-network components. The insights gained from the sensitivity, persistency, and occurrence analysis are valuable to the decision maker.

The insights a decision maker gains from the assessment tool can be used to make protection plans that would increase survivability, security, and maintain throughput of the analyzed network. In addition, the prioritization of the vulnerabilities allows a decision maker to justify and prioritize the expenditure of limited budget resources.

### **Limitations of the Study**

The computational rate of the vulnerability set generation algorithm currently limits the application of the Network Vulnerability Assessment Tool to small networks. The value model input currently allows only a four level hierarchy to be input; however, refinements to the code would allow the user to input a larger hierarchy. In addition, the tool assumes deterministic network features.

### **Recommendations for Future Research**

As mentioned above, the computational rate of the vulnerability set (cut-set) generation algorithm is a limiting factor for large network analysis. Future research

should focus on developing a cut-set algorithm or generating computer code for an existing cut-set algorithm that would improve the computational rate.

Additional input into the value model from a decision maker would allow analysis of an actual network scenario. Furthermore, elicitation of the exact shape and ranges of the value functions would increase viability. The notional network was assumed to have linear value functions. This linearity was used to prove the methodology; however, in most network scenarios the value functions may have some point of diminishing returns implying non-linearities. Further analysis into the correct or most appropriate method of evaluating the value of an alternative with more than one component is suggested.

A graphical user interface and user-friendly macros would allow for wider dissemination and usability of the assessment tool.

Analysis using a real-world network would provide valuable insight into the assessment tool. In addition, it would identify any limitations the assessment tool would have in real-world scenarios.

## **Conclusions**

The approach developed in this effort serves as a method for finding network vulnerabilities that have the highest value for disruption. Using expert opinion, the value model provides a benchmark and metric for ranking the vulnerabilities. The Network Vulnerability Assessment tool was applied to a notional network demonstrated actual application of the models. The outputs of the model, while not computationally quick, provide the decision maker with valuable information on components which could pose

as a possible threat for reducing the reliability of a critical network. This information can be used to make protection plans for the network and maintain control. Additionally, indirect vulnerabilities of sub-network components, which are not rapidly identified without the tool, can be identified. The concepts presented are proven and could be implemented in an operational environment.

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## Appendix A Value Hierarchy

This appendix describes the value hierarchy constructed to evaluate the network vulnerability sets. Each measure, the value function, and weights are presented and explained.




Figure 32 Vulnerability Value Hierarchy with weights

The overall goal is to rank vulnerability sets. This is broken down into three key objectives defined as follows:

1. *Functionality*. The reactions and impacts of the network in a stressed environment.
2. *Flexibility*. The ability to adapt to a stressed environment.
3. *Survivability*. The ability to perform in a stressed environment.

## Functionality

This key objective consists of two evaluation measures: *criticality* and *impact time*. An assessment of the impact to the system in a stressed environment and the importance of that impact are critical when trying to find the most vulnerable components.

*Criticality*: This measure assesses the mission impact. It determines the importance of the component to the network. The more important the component, the higher the vulnerability of the network if the component is disrupted. If the component is critical to the network it is assigned a value of 10. If the component has no impact to the network it is assigned a value of 0. The single dimensional value function is shown in Figure 33.




Figure 33 Criticality Value Function

*Impact Time*: This measure estimates the time it will take, after disruption, for the network to be impacted. The less time it takes for a disrupted component to impact the network, the more vulnerable it is to the system. *Impact Time* is measured in hours. The

component with longest time is assigned a value of one. The value function is shown in Figure 34.




Figure 34 Impact Time Value Function

### Flexibility

This key objective is decomposed into a sub-goal and a measure: *mobile* and *repairable*. They capture the importance of flexibility in a network. Flexibility provides the capability to adapt to different environments. The harder it is to adapt, the more vulnerable the network becomes.

*Mobile*: This sub-goal is defined by ease of transport. If a component cannot be transported then it is easier to target, thus it becomes more vulnerable. As Davis stated, “this is a qualitative measure based on the transportability of the system. The scores are based on four categories: manpacks, vehicle mounted, fixed transportable, fixed permanent” [7]. Figure 35 shows the mobile value function represented as ease of transport.




Figure 35 Ease of Transport Value Function

*Repairable:* This measure determines how fast a component can be repaired in a stressed environment. A component that is quicker to repair is less vulnerable to the network. The time to repair is the number of hours it takes to repair the disrupted component until the component no longer impacts the network. The value function is shown in Figure 36.




Figure 36 Repairable Value Function

### Survivability

Survivability includes both the protection of the media within the network (media protection) and the physical protection of the network components (physical endurance).

In order to determine which components are more vulnerable, an assessment on how they can survive in a stressed environment must be performed.

*Media Protection:* This sub-goal consists of two measures: *redundancy* and *hardening*. These measures determine how well the media in the network is protected.

*Redundancy* is used to measure the number of techniques used to provide redundancy in the network. The more redundancy the less vulnerable the component becomes. Figure 37 shows the value function.




Figure 37 Redundancy Value Function

*Hardening* is used to measure the number of techniques used to prevent intrusion into the system. It indicates how well the media is protected from intruders. The value function is shown in Figure 38.




Figure 38 Hardening Value Function

*Physical Endurance:* This sub-goal includes two measures: *availability* and *physical defense*. These measures determine how well the components of a system perform and how well they are protected.

*Availability* is used to describe the availability of a component. Availability was defined by Davis, “as the percentage of time the component is available to be used by the network” [7]. It is expressed as

$$\text{Availability} = (\text{MTBF})/(\text{MTBF} + \text{MTTR})$$

where MTBF is mean time between failures and MTTR is mean time to repair a failure. Availability can then be used to calculate the total availability of a system comprised of components arranged in parallel and series structures. If  $n$  components are in parallel

$$A = 1 - (\prod_{i=1 \text{ to } n} (1 - A_i))$$

If  $n$  components are in series

$$A = \prod_{i=1 \text{ to } n} (A_i)$$

[7:B-15] The value function is shown in Figure 39.




Figure 39 Availability Value Function

*Physical Defense* is used to measure the number of techniques used to protect the physical components of the system. These techniques can be any number of defense tactics: no defense, a locked door, a barb wire fence, a security gate, a guard, camouflage, ground, or others. The more defense tactics used the less vulnerable the system becomes. The value function is shown in Figure 40.




Figure 40 Physical Defense Value Function

## Appendix B Making Breakfast Network

This appendix shows a making breakfast network. The network is comprised of nodes and links defined as components necessary to make oatmeal and toast for breakfast. The analysis of this network is limited to proving the methodology of the value focused thinking techniques.




Figure 41 Making Breakfast Network

The network components and characteristics are shown in Table 10. These characteristics are used in the Network Vulnerability Assessment Tool value model to determine each component's score. For simplicity, a linear utility function is used for each measure. The vulnerabilities are ranked from highest to lowest score giving a prioritized list of the network's vulnerabilities.



Table 10 Making Breakfast Network Characteristics

Nodes	Criticality	Impact Time	Ease of Transport	Repairable	Redundancy	Hardening	Physical Defense	Availability
1 Power Supply	7	0	4	72	0	0	2	0.95
2 Water Supply	9	0.03	4	72	0	0	2	0.98
3 Gas Supply	9	0	4	72	0	0	3	0.98
4 Refrigerator	2	2	3	4	0	0	1	0.99
5 Stove	9	0	3	4	0	0	1	0.99
6 Toaster	3	0	2	1	1	0	1	0.98
7 Dishwasher	1	0	3	4	1	0	1	0.99
8 Sink	9	0	4	6	3	0	1	1
9 Cooked Food	10	0	4	1	0	0	1	1
10 Store	9	0	4	24	3	0	3	0.95
11 Cupboard	1	0	4	12	1	0	1	1
12 Trash Can	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1
Links								
13 Power	2	0	4	24	0	0	2	0.95
14 Power	7	0	4	24	0	0	2	0.95
15 Power	3	0	4	24	3	0	2	0.95
16 Power	1	0	4	24	0	0	2	0.95
17 Water	2	0	4	24	0	0	2	0.98
18 Water	9	0	4	24	0	0	2	0.98
19 Water	1	0	4	24	0	0	2	0.98
20 Gas	9	0	4	24	0	0	2	0.98
21 Butter	2	0	1	0.02	0	0	1	0.99
22 Heat	10	0	4	6	3	0	1	0.98
23 Toast	3	0	1	0.02	0	0	1	0.99
24 Clean Dishes	0	0	1	0.02	1	0	1	0.99
25 Water	10	0	1	0.02	3	0	1	0.98
26 Dirty Dishes	0	0	1	0.02	1	0	1	0.99
27 Dirty Dishes	0	0	1	0.02	1	0	1	0.99
28 Trash	0	0	1	0.02	1	0	1	0.99
29 Butter	2	0	1	0.02	3	0	0	0.95
30 Oatmeal	10	0	1	0.02	0	0	0	0.95
31 Bread	10	0	1	0.02	11	0	0	0.95
32 Clean Dishes	6	0	1	0.02	3	0	1	0.99
33 Oatmeal	1	0	1	0.02	0	0	1	0.99

The vulnerability scores are shown in Table 11. According to the prioritized list shown in Table 12, the water supply, power supply, gas supply, and oatmeal are the most vulnerable components of the network. The least vulnerable components are the trashcan and refrigerator.

Table 11 Making Breakfast Vulnerability Scores

Weights	Functionality		0.5	Flexibility		0.2		Survivability 0.3						Total Score
			Weighted			Weighted	Media Protection 0.4		Physical Endurance 0.6					
	0.6	0.4		0.3	0.7		0.6	0.4	Weighted	0.7		0.3	Weighted	
Nodes	Crit. Score	Imp Time Sco	Score	EOT Score	Rep. Score	Score	Red. Score	Hard. Score	Score	Phy Def Score	Avail. Score	Score	Score	
1 Power Supply	0.7	1	0.82	1	1	1	1	1	1	0.333	1	0.533	0.826	
2 Water Supply	0.9	0.985	0.934	1	1	1	1	1	1	0.333	0.4	0.353	0.851	
3 Gas Supply	0.9	1	0.94	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0.4	0.12	0.812	
4 Refrigerator	0.2	0	0.12	0.667	0.055	0.239	1	1	1	0.667	0.2	0.527	0.323	
5 Stove	0.9	1	0.94	0.667	0.055	0.239	1	1	1	0.667	0.2	0.527	0.733	
6 Toaster	0.3	1	0.58	0.333	0.014	0.110	0.909	1	0.945	0.667	0.4	0.587	0.531	
7 Dishwasher	0.1	1	0.46	0.667	0.055	0.239	0.909	1	0.945	0.667	0.2	0.527	0.486	
8 Sink	0.9	1	0.94	1	0.083	0.358	0.727	1	0.836	0.667	0	0.467	0.726	
9 Cooked Food	1	1	1	1	0.014	0.310	1	1	1	0.667	0	0.467	0.766	
10 Store	0.9	1	0.94	1	0.333	0.533	0.727	1	0.836	0	1	0.3	0.731	
11 Cupboard	0.1	1	0.46	1	0.166	0.417	0.909	1	0.945	0.667	0	0.467	0.511	
12 Trash Can	0	1	0.4	0	0.014	0.010	0.909	1	0.945	0.667	0	0.467	0.399	
Links														
13 Power	0.2	1	0.52	1	0.333	0.533	1	1	1	0.333	1	0.533	0.583	
14 Power	0.7	1	0.82	1	0.333	0.533	1	1	1	0.333	1	0.533	0.733	
15 Power	0.3	1	0.58	1	0.333	0.533	0.727	1	0.836	0.333	1	0.533	0.593	
16 Power	0.1	1	0.46	1	0.333	0.533	1	1	1	0.333	1	0.533	0.553	
17 Water	0.2	1	0.52	1	0.333	0.533	1	1	1	0.333	0.4	0.353	0.550	
18 Water	0.9	1	0.94	1	0.333	0.533	1	1	1	0.333	0.4	0.353	0.760	
19 Water	0.1	1	0.46	1	0.333	0.533	1	1	1	0.333	0.4	0.353	0.520	
20 Gas	0.9	1	0.94	1	0.333	0.533	1	1	1	0.333	0.4	0.353	0.760	
21 Butter	0.2	1	0.52	0	0	0	1	1	1	0.667	0.2	0.527	0.475	
22 Heat	1	1	1	1	0.083	0.358	0.727	1	0.836	0.667	0.4	0.587	0.778	
23 Toast	0.3	1	0.58	0	0	0	1	1	1	0.667	0.2	0.527	0.505	
24 Clean Dishes	0	1	0.4	0	0	0	0.909	1	0.945	0.667	0.2	0.527	0.408	
25 Water	1	1	1	0	0	0	0.727	1	0.836	0.667	0.4	0.587	0.706	
26 Dirty Dishes	0	1	0.4	0	0	0	0.909	1	0.945	0.667	0.2	0.527	0.408	
27 Dirty Dishes	0	1	0.4	0	0	0	0.909	1	0.945	0.667	0.2	0.527	0.408	
28 Trash	0	1	0.4	0	0	0	0.909	1	0.945	0.667	0.2	0.527	0.408	
29 Butter	0.2	1	0.52	0	0	0	0.727	1	0.836	1	1	1	0.540	
30 Oatmeal	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0.8	
31 Bread	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0.4	1	1	1	0.728	
32 Clean Dishes	0.6	1	0.76	0	0	0	0.727	1	0.836	0.667	0.2	0.527	0.575	
33 Oatmeal	0.1	1	0.46	0	0	0	1	1	1	0.667	0.2	0.527	0.445	

Table 12 Prioritized Vulnerability List

Nodes	Total Score
2 Water Supply	0.851
1 Power Supply	0.826
3 Gas Supply	0.812
30 Oatmeal	0.8
22 Heat	0.778
9 Cooked Food	0.766
18 Water	0.760
20 Gas	0.760
14 Power	0.733
5 Stove	0.733
10 Store	0.731
31 Bread	0.728
8 Sink	0.726
25 Water	0.706
15 Power	0.593
13 Power	0.583
32 Clean Dishes	0.575
16 Power	0.553
17 Water	0.550
29 Butter	0.540
6 Toaster	0.531
19 Water	0.520
11 Cupboard	0.511
23 Toast	0.505
7 Dishwasher	0.486
21 Butter	0.475
33 Oatmeal	0.445
24 Clean Dishes	0.408
26 Dirty Dishes	0.408
27 Dirty Dishes	0.408
28 Trash	0.408
12 Trash Can	0.399
4 Refrigerator	0.323

## **Appendix C Notional Network Data**

This appendix contains the complete data set of the notional network results.

Notional Network Node Attributes

Component	Description	Criticality	Impact Time	Ease of Transport	Repairable	Redundancy	Hardening	Availability	Physical Defense
Node 2	Socorro Optical Sensor	9	24	4	72	0	0	0.95	4
Node 3	Maui Optical Sensor	9	24	4	72	0	0	0.93	1
Node 4	Diego Garcia Optical Sensor	9	24	4	72	0	0	0.94	5
Node 5	Primary router	9	24	3	24	0	0	0.98	2
Node 6	Primary router	7	48	4	24	1	0	0.98	1
Node 7	Satellite	6	48	2	12	1	1	0.95	3
Node 8	Primary router	7	48	4	24	1	0	0.98	1
Node 9	Primary router	7	48	3	24	1	0	0.98	1
Node 10	Tertiary router	4	120	4	24	1	0	0.98	1
Node 11	OC3F-Edwards	8	48	4	72	0	0	0.98	2
Node 12	Primary router	8	48	4	24	0	0	0.98	1
Node 13	Peterson AFB	8	24	4	48	0	0	0.98	3
Node 14	Shriever AFB	6	24	4	48	0	0	0.98	4
Node 15	Secondary router	6	48	3	24	1	0	0.98	1
Node 16	Colorado Springs router	8	24	4	48	0	0	0.97	1
Node 17	Tertiary router	4	120	4	24	1	0	0.98	1
Node 18	NAVSPACE	4	120	4	24	1	0	0.98	1
Node 19	Cheyenne Mountain Air Station	10	0	4	96	0	1	0.99	5

Notional Network Link Attributes

Component	Description	Criticality	Impact Time	Ease of Transport	Repairable	Redundancy	Hardening	Availability	Physical Defense
Link 2 to 5	Primary data line	9	24	4	12	2	0	0.99	1
Link 3 to 6	Primary microwave line	8	48	4	48	0	0	0.96	1
Link 3 to 7	Satellite relay	6	48	3	12	2	0	0.97	2
Link 4 to 7	Satellite relay	6	48	3	12	2	0	0.97	2
Link 4 to 8	Primary microwave line	8	48	4	48	1	0	0.96	1
Link 5 to 10	Tertiary data line	4	120	4	48	0	0	0.99	1
Link 5 to 11	Primary data line	8	48	4	12	0	0	0.99	1
Link 5 to 13	Secondary data line	6	48	4	48	0	0	0.99	1
Link 6 to 10	Tertiary data line	4	120	4	48	0	0	0.99	1
Link 6 to 11	Primary data line	8	48	4	48	0	0	0.99	1
Link 6 to 13	Secondary data line	6	48	4	48	0	0	0.98	1
Link 7 to 11	Satellite relay	6	48	3	12	2	0	0.97	2
Link 7 to 14	Satellite relay	6	48	3	12	2	0	0.97	2
Link 7 to 18	Satellite relay	3	120	3	12	2	0	0.97	2
Link 8 to 9	Primary data line	8	48	4	48	1	0	0.99	1
Link 9 to 11	Primary data line	8	48	4	12	0	0	0.99	1
Link 9 to 13	Secondary data line	6	48	4	24	0	0	0.99	1
Link 10 to 18	Tertiary data line	4	120	4	48	0	0	0.99	1
Link 11 to 12	Primary data line	8	48	4	24	1	0	0.99	1
Link 11 to 15	Secondary data line	6	72	4	48	0	0	0.98	1
Link 11 to 17	Tertiary data line	4	120	4	48	0	0	0.99	1
Link 12 to 13	Primary data line	8	48	4	24	1	0	0.98	1
Link 13 to 16	Primary data line	8	24	4	24	1	0	0.98	1
Link 14 to 16	Secondary data line	6	24	4	48	1	0	0.99	1
Link 15 to 19	Secondary data line	6	48	4	48	0	0	0.99	1
Link 16 to 19	Primary data line	8	24	4	48	1	0	0.98	1
Link 17 to 18	Tertiary data line	4	120	4	48	0	0	0.99	1

Notional Sub-Network Attributes

Component	Criticality	Timeliness	Ease of Transport	Repairable	Redundancy	Hardening	Reliability	Physical	Defense
Node 2	9	24	4	72	0	0	0.95		1
2W1	2	120	4	72	0	0	0.98		1
2W2	2	120	4	48	0	0	0.98		0
2P1	8	48	4	24	1	0	0.97		1
Link 2W1 to 2W2	2	120	4	24	0	0	0.98		1
Link 2W2 to 2	2	120	4	24	0	0	0.98		1
Link 2P1 to 2	8	48	4	24	1	0	0.98		1
Node 3	9	24	4	72	0	0	0.93		1
3P1	8	48	4	72	0	0	0.95		1
3P2	8	48	4	48	1	0	0.96		0
Link 3P1 to 3P2	8	48	4	24	0	0	0.98		0
Link 3P2 to 3	8	48	4	24	1	0	0.98		0
Node 4	9	24	4	72	0	0	0.94		5
4W1	2	120	4	48	0	0	0.98		1
4P1	9	48	4	48	1	0	0.94		2
Link 4W1 to 4	2	120	4	24	0	0	0.98		1
Link 4P1 to 4	9	48	4	24	1	0	0.95		1
Node 11	8	48	4	72	0	0	0.98		2
11P1	8	48	4	24	0	0	0.98		2
Link 11P1 to 11	8	48	4	24	0	0	0.98		1
Node 18	4	120	4	24	1	0	0.98		1
18W1	2	120	4	48	0	0	0.97		0
18P1	4	120	4	24	1	0	0.97		1
Link 18W1 to 18	2	120	4	48	0	0	0.98		1
Link 18P1 to 18	4	120	4	24	1	0	0.98		0

Notional Sub-Network Attributes (cont.)

Component	Criticality	Timeliness	Ease of Transport	Repairable	Redundancy	Hardening	Reliability	Physical	Defense
Node 19	10	0	4	96	0	1	0.99		5
19P1	10	6	4	12	1	1	0.98		4
19P2	7	48	4	48	0	0	0.96		1
19P3	7	48	4	48	0	0	0.97		0
19W1	6	12	4	72	0	0	0.97		1
19W2	6	6	4	48	1	1	0.97		0
Link 19P1 to 19	10	6	4	12	1	1	0.98		4
Link 19P2 to 19P3	7	48	4	24	0	0	0.98		0
Link 19P3 to 19	7	48	4	24	0	0	0.98		1
Link 19W1 to 19W2	6	12	4	24	0	0	0.98		1
Link 19W2 to 19	6	6	4	24	1	1	0.98		1



# Notional Network Top Twenty Vulnerability Set Composition and Values

Vulnerability Set	Components				Value
32750	Node 2 Socorro Optical Sensor	Node 3 Maui Optical Sensor	Node 4 Diego Garcia Optical Sensor		0.87
32752	Node 3 Maui Optical Sensor	Node 4 Diego Garcia Optical Sensor	Node 5 Primary Router		0.84
32751	Link 2 to 5 Primary Data Line	Node 3 Maui Optical Sensor	Node 4 Diego Garcia Optical Sensor		0.84
25729	Node 2 Socorro Optical Sensor	Node 3 Maui Optical Sensor	Link 4 to 7 Satellite Relay	Node 11 OC3F-Edwards	0.76
25657	Node 2 Socorro Optical Sensor	Node 3 Maui Optical Sensor	Link 4 to 7 Satellite Relay	Node 11 OC3F-Edwards	0.75
25693	Node 2 Socorro Optical Sensor	Node 3 Maui Optical Sensor	Link 4 to 7 Satellite Relay	Node 11 OC3F-Edwards	0.75
25639	Node 2 Socorro Optical Sensor	Node 3 Maui Optical Sensor	Link 4 to 7 Satellite Relay	Link 9 to 11 Primary Data Line	0.74
25594	Node 2 Socorro Optical Sensor	Node 3 Maui Optical Sensor	Link 4 to 7 Satellite Relay	Node 11 OC3F-Edwards	0.74
30803	Node 3 Maui Optical Sensor	Node 4 Diego Garcia Optical Sensor	Link 5 to 10 Tertiary Data Line	Node 11 OC3F-Edwards	0.74
30564	Node 3 Maui Optical Sensor	Node 4 Diego Garcia Optical Sensor	Link 10 to 18 Tertiary Data Line	Node 11 OC3F-Edwards	0.74
25658	Link 2 to 5 Primary Data Line	Node 3 Maui Optical Sensor	Link 4 to 7 Satellite Relay	Node 11 OC3F-Edwards	0.73
25730	Link 2 to 5 Primary Data Line	Node 3 Maui Optical Sensor	Link 4 to 7 Satellite Relay	Node 11 OC3F-Edwards	0.73
30804	Node 3 Maui Optical Sensor	Node 4 Diego Garcia Optical Sensor	Link 5 to 10 Tertiary Data Line	Node 11 OC3F-Edwards	0.73
30566	Node 3 Maui Optical Sensor	Node 4 Diego Garcia Optical Sensor	Link 10 to 18 Tertiary Data Line	Node 11 OC3F-Edwards	0.73

Notional Network Top Twenty Vulnerability Set Composition and Values (Cont.)

Vulnerability Set	Components					Value
30805	Node 3 Maui Optical Sensor	Node 4 Diego Garcia Optical Sensor	Link 5 to 10 Tertiary Data Line	Node 11 OC3F-Edwards	Node 19 CMAS	0.73
30568	Node 3 Maui Optical Sensor	Node 4 Diego Garcia Optical Sensor	Link 10 to 18 Tertiary Data Line	Node 11 OC3F-Edwards	Node 19 CMAS	0.73
25732	Node 2 Socorro Optical Sensor	Node 3 Maui Optical Sensor	Node 7 Satellite	Node 11 OC3F-Edwards	Node 19 CMAS	0.72
25659	Node 3 Maui Optical Sensor	Link 4 to 7 Satellite Relay	Node 5 Primary Router	Node 11 OC3F-Edwards	Node 16 C. Springs Router	0.72
25731	Node 3 Maui Optical Sensor	Link 4 to 7 Satellite Relay	Node 5 Primary Router	Node 11 OC3F-Edwards	Node 19 CMAS	0.72
25695	Node 3 Maui Optical Sensor	Link 4 to 7 Satellite Relay	Node 5 Primary Router	Node 11 OC3F-Edwards	Link 16 to 19 Primary Data Line	0.71

### Major Objective Vulnerability Set Value Composition

Vulnerability Set	Functionality	Flexibility	Survivability	Total
32750	0.5	0.2	0.174	0.874
32752	0.5	0.14	0.1992	0.8392
32751	0.5	0.15	0.1884	0.8384
25729	0.405	0.146	0.2076	0.7586
25657	0.44	0.17	0.1452	0.7552
25693	0.405	0.146	0.198	0.749
25639	0.405	0.116	0.2184	0.7394
25594	0.405	0.134	0.198	0.737
30803	0.335	0.176	0.2244	0.7354
30564	0.335	0.176	0.2244	0.7354
25658	0.405	0.116	0.2112	0.7322
25730	0.44	0.14	0.1488	0.7288
30804	0.335	0.176	0.216	0.727
30566	0.335	0.176	0.216	0.727
30805	0.375	0.2	0.1512	0.7262
30568	0.375	0.2	0.1512	0.7262
25732	0.44	0.158	0.1236	0.7216
25659	0.405	0.11	0.2064	0.7214
25731	0.44	0.134	0.144	0.718
25695	0.405	0.11	0.192	0.707

Evaluation Measure Vulnerability Set Composition

Vulnerability Set	Criticality	Impact Time	Ease of Transport	Repairable	Redundancy	Hardening	Availability	Physical Defense	Total
32750	0.3	0.2	0.06	0.14	0.072	0.048	0.054	0	0.874
32752	0.3	0.2	0.04	0.1	0.072	0.048	0.0432	0.036	0.8392
32751	0.3	0.2	0.06	0.09	0.0432	0.048	0.0432	0.054	0.8384
25729	0.23	0.175	0.048	0.098	0.0552	0.048	0.0324	0.072	0.7586
25657	0.255	0.185	0.048	0.122	0.0552	0.0288	0.0324	0.0288	0.7552
25693	0.23	0.175	0.048	0.098	0.0456	0.048	0.0324	0.072	0.749
25639	0.23	0.175	0.048	0.068	0.0552	0.048	0.0324	0.0828	0.7394
25594	0.23	0.175	0.048	0.086	0.0456	0.048	0.0324	0.072	0.737
30803	0.2	0.135	0.06	0.116	0.072	0.048	0.0324	0.072	0.7354
30564	0.2	0.135	0.06	0.116	0.072	0.048	0.0324	0.072	0.7354
25658	0.23	0.175	0.048	0.068	0.0372	0.048	0.0216	0.1044	0.7322
25730	0.255	0.185	0.048	0.092	0.0372	0.0288	0.0216	0.0612	0.7288
30804	0.2	0.135	0.06	0.116	0.0636	0.048	0.0324	0.072	0.727
30566	0.2	0.135	0.06	0.116	0.0636	0.048	0.0324	0.072	0.727
30805	0.23	0.145	0.06	0.14	0.072	0.0288	0.0216	0.0288	0.7262
30568	0.23	0.145	0.06	0.14	0.072	0.0288	0.0216	0.0288	0.7262
25732	0.255	0.185	0.036	0.122	0.0636	0.0096	0.0324	0.018	0.7216
25659	0.23	0.175	0.036	0.074	0.0432	0.048	0.0216	0.0936	0.7214
25731	0.255	0.185	0.036	0.098	0.0432	0.0288	0.0216	0.0504	0.718
25695	0.23	0.175	0.036	0.074	0.0288	0.048	0.0216	0.0936	0.707

### Sensitivity Analysis

Functionality	0	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.9	1
Vulnerability Set 32750	0.75	0.77	0.80	0.82	0.85	<b>0.87</b>	0.90	0.92	0.95	0.97	1.00
Vulnerability Set 32752	0.68	0.71	0.74	0.78	0.81	<b>0.84</b>	0.87	0.90	0.94	0.97	1.00
Vulnerability Set 32751	0.68	0.71	0.74	0.77	0.81	<b>0.84</b>	0.87	0.90	0.94	0.97	1.00
Vulnerability Set 25729	0.63	0.66	0.68	0.71	0.73	<b>0.76</b>	0.78	0.81	0.84	0.86	0.89
Vulnerability Set 25657	0.71	0.72	0.73	0.74	0.75	<b>0.75</b>	0.76	0.77	0.78	0.79	0.80

Flexibility	0	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.9	1
Vulnerability Set 32750	0.57	0.86	<b>0.87</b>	0.89	0.91	0.92	0.94	0.95	0.98	0.98	1.00
Vulnerability Set 32752	0.57	0.86	<b>0.84</b>	0.82	0.81	0.79	0.77	0.76	0.75	0.72	0.70
Vulnerability Set 32751	0.52	0.85	<b>0.84</b>	0.83	0.83	0.81	0.80	0.79	0.78	0.76	0.75
Vulnerability Set 25729	0.47	0.75	<b>0.76</b>	0.77	0.79	0.79	0.80	0.82	0.83	0.84	0.85
Vulnerability Set 25657	0.43	0.76	<b>0.75</b>	0.75	0.76	0.75	0.74	0.74	0.75	0.73	0.73

Redundancy	0	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.9	1
Vulnerability Set 32750	0.87	0.87	0.87	0.87	0.87	0.87	<b>0.87</b>	0.87	0.87	0.87	0.87
Vulnerability Set 32752	0.84	0.84	0.84	0.84	0.84	0.84	<b>0.84</b>	0.84	0.84	0.84	0.84
Vulnerability Set 32751	0.87	0.86	0.86	0.85	0.85	0.84	<b>0.84</b>	0.83	0.83	0.82	0.82
Vulnerability Set 25729	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.76	<b>0.76</b>	0.76	0.76	0.76	0.77
Vulnerability Set 25657	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.76	0.76	0.76	<b>0.75</b>	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.74

Availability	0	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.9	1
Vulnerability Set 32750	0.82	0.84	0.86	<b>0.87</b>	0.89	0.91	0.93	0.95	0.96	0.98	0.82
Vulnerability Set 32752	0.76	0.82	0.83	<b>0.84</b>	0.85	0.86	0.87	0.88	0.89	0.90	0.76
Vulnerability Set 32751	0.74	0.83	0.83	<b>0.84</b>	0.85	0.85	0.86	0.87	0.87	0.88	0.74
Vulnerability Set 25729	0.70	0.74	0.75	<b>0.76</b>	0.77	0.77	0.78	0.79	0.79	0.80	0.70
Vulnerability Set 25657	0.65	0.75	0.75	<b>0.75</b>	0.76	0.76	0.76	0.76	0.76	0.76	0.65

Survivability	0	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.9	1
Vulnerability Set 32750	1.00	0.96	0.92	<b>0.87</b>	0.83	0.79	0.75	0.71	0.66	0.62	0.58
Vulnerability Set 32752	0.91	0.89	0.86	<b>0.84</b>	0.81	0.79	0.77	0.74	0.71	0.69	0.66
Vulnerability Set 32751	0.93	0.90	0.87	<b>0.84</b>	0.81	0.78	0.75	0.72	0.69	0.66	0.63
Vulnerability Set 25729	0.88	0.84	0.80	<b>0.76</b>	0.72	0.68	0.64	0.60	0.56	0.52	0.48
Vulnerability Set 25657	0.78	0.77	0.76	<b>0.75</b>	0.75	0.74	0.73	0.72	0.71	0.70	0.69

Criticality	0	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.9	1
Vulnerability Set 32750	0.87	0.87	0.87	0.87	0.87	0.87	<b>0.87</b>	0.87	0.87	0.87	0.87
Vulnerability Set 32752	0.84	0.84	0.84	0.84	0.84	0.84	<b>0.84</b>	0.84	0.84	0.84	0.84
Vulnerability Set 32751	0.84	0.84	0.84	0.84	0.84	0.84	<b>0.84</b>	0.84	0.84	0.84	0.84
Vulnerability Set 25729	0.78	0.78	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.76	<b>0.76</b>	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.74
Vulnerability Set 25657	0.79	0.78	0.78	0.77	0.77	0.76	<b>0.75</b>	0.75	0.74	0.74	0.73

Ease of Transport	0	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.9	1
Vulnerability Set 32750	0.87	0.87	0.87	<b>0.87</b>	0.87	0.87	0.87	0.87	0.87	0.87	0.87
Vulnerability Set 32752	0.84	0.84	0.84	<b>0.84</b>	0.84	0.84	0.84	0.84	0.83	0.83	0.83
Vulnerability Set 32751	0.82	0.82	0.83	<b>0.84</b>	0.85	0.85	0.86	0.87	0.87	0.88	0.89
Vulnerability Set 25729	0.76	0.76	0.76	<b>0.76</b>	0.76	0.76	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75
Vulnerability Set 25657	0.75	0.75	0.75	<b>0.75</b>	0.76	0.76	0.76	0.76	0.76	0.77	0.77

Media Protection	0	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.9	1
Vulnerability Set 32750	0.79	0.81	0.83	0.85	<b>0.87</b>	0.90	0.92	0.94	0.96	0.98	1.00
Vulnerability Set 32752	0.77	0.79	0.81	0.82	<b>0.84</b>	0.86	0.87	0.89	0.91	0.92	0.94
Vulnerability Set 32751	0.81	0.82	0.83	0.83	<b>0.84</b>	0.85	0.85	0.86	0.87	0.87	0.88
Vulnerability Set 25729	0.72	0.73	0.74	0.75	<b>0.76</b>	0.77	0.78	0.79	0.80	0.81	0.82
Vulnerability Set 25657	0.72	0.73	0.74	0.75	<b>0.75</b>	0.76	0.77	0.78	0.79	0.80	0.80

# Persistency Analysis

Functionality	0	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.9	1
Node 2	0	1	3	4	5	10	12	10	10	7	7
Node 3	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	15	15
Node 4	19	19	17	17	16	7	3	3	3	3	3
Node 5	0	0	1	1	1	3	4	5	5	7	6
Node 7	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	6	6	11	11
Node 10	0	1	2	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Node 11	7	10	15	15	14	13	10	10	10	9	8
Node 12	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Node 13	0	0	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	0	0
Node 16	10	12	6	6	7	6	4	2	2	0	0
Node 18	1	1	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Node 19	0	0	0	0	3	6	8	12	12	17	17
Link 2 to 5	0	0	1	1	1	3	4	5	5	6	7
Link 3 to 6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	5
Link 4 to 7	0	0	1	2	4	13	15	11	11	6	6
Link 4 to 8	1	1	2	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
Link 5 to 10	8	8	6	6	6	2	0	0	0	0	0
Link 5 to 11	0	2	2	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
Link 5 to 13	8	3	3	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Link 9 to 11	0	0	0	0	1	3	6	7	7	8	9
Link 10 to 18	11	9	6	6	6	2	0	0	0	0	0
Link 11 to 15	7	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Link 11 to 17	7	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Link 13 to 16	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	0	0
Link 14 to 16	1	1	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Link 15 to 19	6	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Link 16 to 19	2	2	3	4	3	2	2	1	1	0	0
Link 17 to 18	6	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Flexibility	0	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.9	1
Node 2	5	9	<b>10</b>	7	5	2	2	2	2	1	1
Node 3	19	20	<b>20</b>	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20
Node 4	0	3	<b>7</b>	12	16	19	19	19	19	20	20
Node 5	9	7	<b>3</b>	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Node 7	8	0	<b>0</b>	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Node 10	0	0	<b>0</b>	1	2	2	1	1	2	3	3
Node 11	5	9	<b>13</b>	17	15	15	12	12	12	11	11
Node 13	10	0	<b>1</b>	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Node 16	0	6	<b>6</b>	3	4	3	2	2	2	2	2
Node 17	0	0	<b>0</b>	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
Node 19	0	3	<b>6</b>	7	7	6	10	10	11	11	11
Link 2 to 5	6	4	<b>3</b>	2	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Link 3 to 6	1	0	<b>0</b>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Link 4 to 7	12	17	<b>13</b>	7	3	1	1	1	1	0	0
Link 4 to 8	0	1	<b>1</b>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Link 5 to 10	0	0	<b>2</b>	4	5	7	8	8	8	8	8
Link 5 to 11	0	0	<b>0</b>	0	2	2	2	2	2	0	0
Link 5 to 13	0	0	<b>0</b>	0	0	2	2	2	2	2	2
Link 9 to 11	15	7	<b>3</b>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Link 9 to 13	3	0	<b>0</b>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Link 10 to 18	0	0	<b>2</b>	4	6	7	8	8	8	8	8
Link 11 to 17	0	0	<b>0</b>	0	0	0	2	2	3	3	3
Link 13 to 16	7	2	<b>1</b>	1	1	2	0	0	0	0	0
Link 16 to 19	0	5	<b>2</b>	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	2
Link 17 to 18	0	0	<b>0</b>	0	0	0	2	2	2	3	3



Survivability	0	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.9	1
Node 2	9	9	11	10	8	6	3	1	0	0	0
Node 3	19	19	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	18	17
Node 4	6	6	6	7	9	10	11	6	2	0	0
Node 5	4	4	2	3	4	4	5	5	4	4	0
Node 7	5	5	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Node 8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0
Node 9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0
Node 10	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0
Node 11	13	13	12	13	11	10	7	3	1	0	0
Node 12	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	6	12	15	15
Node 13	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Node 15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0
Node 16	1	1	2	6	9	11	12	9	4	2	5
Node 18	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	10	16	14	7
Node 19	14	14	11	6	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Link 2 to 5	4	4	4	3	2	3	3	1	2	0	0
Link 3 to 6	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
Link 4 to 7	9	9	11	13	11	10	7	4	2	6	13
Link 4 to 8	0	0	1	1	1	1	2	9	11	12	10
Link 5 to 10	1	1	1	2	3	3	3	3	2	3	5
Link 5 to 11	0	0	0	0	2	2	4	5	4	2	2
Link 5 to 13	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	6	10	14	15
Link 6 to 13	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Link 8 to 9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Link 9 to 11	4	4	4	3	3	4	4	4	2	2	2
Link 9 to 13	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	4	5
Link 10 to 18	1	1	1	2	3	3	3	3	2	3	8
Link 11 to 12	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0
Link 11 to 15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	8	8	10
Link 11 to 17	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	6
Link 12 to 13	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	0
Link 13 to 16	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Link 14 to 16	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	10	16	14	7
Link 15 to 19	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	4	6	9	8
Link 16 to 19	1	1	1	2	5	5	3	0	0	0	0
Link 17 to 18	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	5

Criticality	0	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.9	1
Node 2	12	12	12	12	12	12	10	9	9	9	7
Node 3	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20
Node 4	3	3	3	3	5	5	7	9	9	10	12
Node 5	4	4	4	4	3	3	3	3	3	2	2
Node 7	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	0	0	0	0
Node 10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Node 11	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	14	14	14	12
Node 13	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
Node 16	5	5	5	5	7	7	6	5	5	4	6
Node 19	5	5	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	7	7
Link 2 to 5	4	4	4	4	3	3	3	2	2	2	2
Link 4 to 7	15	15	15	15	13	13	13	11	11	10	8
Link 4 to 8	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Link 5 to 10	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	3	3	3	4
Link 5 to 11	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Link 9 to 11	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2
Link 10 to 18	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	3	3	3	4
Link 13 to 16	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
Link 16 to 19	4	4	4	4	2	2	2	3	3	3	3

Ease of Transport	0	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.9	1
Node 2	11	11	11	10	10	10	10	8	8	7	7
Node 3	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20
Node 4	7	7	7	7	7	6	7	7	7	7	6
Node 5	3	3	3	3	3	2	1	1	1	1	1
Node 7	3	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Node 10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Node 11	15	14	14	13	13	12	10	9	8	8	6
Node 13	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1
Node 16	5	6	6	6	6	7	8	8	8	8	7
Node 19	7	7	7	6	4	3	2	3	2	1	1
Link 2 to 5	2	2	2	3	3	5	5	7	7	8	9
Link 4 to 7	10	11	11	13	13	14	13	13	13	13	14
Link 4 to 8	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
Link 5 to 10	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	1
Link 5 to 11	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2	3
Link 9 to 11	1	2	2	3	3	4	4	6	7	7	8
Link 10 to 18	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1
Link 13 to 16	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	3	4	4
Link 16 to 19	2	1	1	2	4	4	3	4	4	4	4

Redundancy	0	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.9	1
Node 2	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	11	10	10	8
Node 3	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20
Node 4	3	3	3	5	5	6	7	7	8	8	10
Node 5	3	3	3	3	4	3	3	3	3	3	3
Node 7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	4	4
Node 10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Node 11	10	10	11	13	13	13	13	14	15	14	13
Node 13	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
Node 16	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	6	6	5	4
Node 19	1	1	2	2	3	4	6	7	8	10	12
Link 2 to 5	7	7	7	5	4	4	3	2	2	2	2
Link 4 to 7	17	17	17	15	15	14	13	11	10	8	6
Link 4 to 8	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Link 5 to 10	0	0	0	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	3
Link 5 to 11	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Link 8 to 9	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Link 9 to 11	4	4	3	2	2	3	3	2	2	3	2
Link 10 to 18	0	0	0	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	3
Link 13 to 16	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	0	0
Link 16 to 19	5	5	4	4	4	4	2	1	1	1	1

Availability	0	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.9	1
Node 2	9	8	10	10	11	11	11	12	12	12	9
Node 3	19	20	20	20	20	20	20	19	19	19	19
Node 4	8	5	5	7	8	8	8	9	9	9	8
Node 5	4	5	4	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	4
Node 7	4	0	0	0	1	2	2	2	3	3	4
Node 10	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
Node 11	12	13	13	13	13	14	14	12	13	13	12
Node 13	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Node 16	1	8	6	6	4	5	5	4	4	4	1
Node 19	14	3	4	6	7	8	8	8	8	8	14
Link 2 to 5	2	5	4	3	2	2	2	1	1	1	2
Link 3 to 6	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1
Link 3 to 7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0
Link 4 to 7	8	15	15	13	11	10	10	9	8	8	8
Link 4 to 8	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
Link 5 to 10	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Link 5 to 11	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Link 9 to 11	3	4	3	3	3	2	2	3	2	2	3
Link 10 to 18	2	1	1	2	3	2	2	2	2	2	2
Link 13 to 16	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
Link 16 to 19	1	4	4	2	3	1	1	1	1	1	1

Media Protection	0	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.9	1
Node 2	8	8	8	10	10	9	9	8	6	6	6
Node 3	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20
Node 4	3	3	3	5	7	9	11	12	14	14	14
Node 5	1	2	4	4	3	3	2	2	2	2	2
Node 7	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	1
Node 10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1
Node 11	9	10	11	13	13	15	15	15	14	14	14
Node 13	0	0	0	1	1	1	3	3	3	3	3
Node 16	5	6	5	6	6	5	4	4	3	3	3
Node 19	3	3	4	4	6	7	6	7	8	8	9
Link 2 to 5	11	10	8	4	3	2	1	1	1	1	1
Link 4 to 7	16	16	17	15	13	10	8	7	6	6	5
Link 4 to 8	2	2	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Link 5 to 10	0	0	0	1	2	3	4	4	5	5	5
Link 5 to 11	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2
Link 8 to 9	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Link 9 to 11	5	5	4	3	3	2	2	2	1	1	1
Link 10 to 18	0	0	0	1	2	3	4	4	5	5	5
Link 13 to 16	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
Link 16 to 19	4	4	4	4	2	3	3	3	3	3	2

## **Appendix D Visual Basic Code**

This appendix contains all the visual basic modules used in the *Network Vulnerability Assessment Tool*.

## Cut-Set Module

'This module inputs the network topology and then uses the inversion method to find  
'all the cut-sets and labels them as vulnerability sets. The algorithm was  
'developed from the code written Fortran found in Bailey's thesis [1]. It was modified  
'and adapted to eliminate the capacities and probabilities.

```
Const AC As Integer = 80, RW As Long = 100000, ND As Integer = 50
Dim NDTOT As Integer, N As Integer, T As Long, P As Integer
Dim Cut(RW, AC) As Long, Path(RW, AC) As Long
Dim Head(AC) As Integer, Tail(AC) As Integer
Dim I As Integer, J As Integer, R As Integer, C As Integer, Flag As Integer, CYC As Integer
Dim ARCCAP(ND, ND) As Integer, Mark(ND, ND) As Integer, MATCOL(ND, ND) As Integer
Dim INN As Integer, OUTT As Integer, XR(RW) As Long, XR1(RW) As Long, XB(RW) As Long,
XB1(RW) As Long
Dim Row(RW) As Long, Col(AC) As Integer, TT As Long
Dim K As Long, L As Integer, M As Integer, PP As Integer, SR As Integer, SK As Integer
```

```
Sub CutSet()
```

```
'Input Topology
With Sheets("Input")
    .Range("a2:a16384").ClearContents
    Sheets("Input").Activate
```

```
Input1:
    NDTOT = Application.InputBox("Enter the total number of nodes", "Network Components",
    Type:=1)
    If NDTOT = False Then Exit Sub
```

```
MsgBox ("Note: Source ID number must be 1 and the Terminal node ID number must equal the total
number of nodes.")
```

```
'Identify Dummy Source and Sink Nodes
```

```
SR = 0
SK = 0
```

```
Input2:
    SR = Application.InputBox("Enter 1 if the Source node is a dummy node. Enter 0 otherwise.",
    "Dummy Source", Type:=1)
    If SR = 1 Or SR = 0 Then
        GoTo Input3
    Else
        MsgBox ("That is not an option. Please re-enter.")
        GoTo Input2
    End If
```

```
Input3:
    SK = Application.InputBox("Enter 1 if the Sink node is a dummy node. Enter 0 otherwise.", "Dummy
    Sink", Type:=1)
    If SK = 1 Or SK = 0 Then
```

```

        GoTo 10
    Else
        MsgBox ("That is not an option. Please re-enter.")
        GoTo Input3
    End If
10:

K = 2

For I = 1 To NDTOT
    ARCCAP(I, I) = 1
    If SR = 1 And I = 1 Or SK = 1 And I = NDTOT Then
        GoTo 20
    Else
        .Cells(K, 1) = "Node " & I
        K = K + 1
    End If
20:
Next I

'Arcs
If SR = 1 And SK = 1 Then
    K = NDTOT
End If

If SR = 1 And SK <> 1 Or SR <> 1 And SK = 1 Then
    K = NDTOT + 1
End If

If SR <> 1 And SK <> 1 Then
    K = NDTOT + 2
End If

With Sheets("Stats")
    .Cells(3, 2) = K
End With

Flag = 0
iAnswer = MsgBox("Click OK to enter Links. Click Cancel to exit routine.", vbOKCancel, "Network Components")

If iAnswer = vbCancel Then Exit Sub

MsgBox ("When arc entry is completed enter 0 for the head and 0 for the tail to continue with routine.")

40:
Do While Flag <> 1

    If Flag = 0 Then

        I = Application.InputBox("Enter arc tail", "Link", Type:=1)
        J = Application.InputBox("Enter arc head", "Link", Type:=1)

        If J = 0 And I = 0 Then Exit Do

```

```

    If SR = 1 And I = 1 Or SK = 1 And J = NDTOT Then
        GoTo 50
    Else
        .Cells(K, 1) = "Link " & I & " to " & J
        K = K + 1
    End If
50:
    If I > NDTOT Or J > NDTOT Then
        MsgBox ("Node is out of range!")
        GoTo 40
    End If
    ARCCAP(I, J) = 1
End If

Loop

End With

'Calculate Pathset/Cutset Matrices Columns

N = 1
For I = 1 To NDTOT
    For J = 1 To NDTOT
        If ARCCAP(I, J) > 0 Then
            MATCOL(I, J) = N
            Head(N) = J
            Tail(N) = I
            N = N + 1
        End If
    Next J
Next I
N = N - 1

'Calculate Acyclic paths from source to sink

P = 1
I = 1
J = 1
Flag = 0
CYC = 0

430:
If Flag = 0 Then

435:
    If J < NDTOT Then

        'Find next arc segment
        R = I
        C = J
        I = J
        J = 1

440:

```



```

    If ARCCAP(I, J) > 0 And Mark(I, J) = 0 And I <> J Or J > NDTOT Then
        GoTo 445
    Else
        J = J + 1
        GoTo 440
    End If

    'Record arc segment
445:
    If MATCOL(I, J) > 0 Then
        Path(P, MATCOL(I, J)) = ARCCAP(I, J)
    End If
    If ARCCAP(I, I) > 0 Then
        Path(P, MATCOL(I, I)) = ARCCAP(I, I)
    End If

    'Mark Row(I) to Guard Against Cycling

    If Row(I) = 1 Then
        J = NDTOT + 1
        CYC = 1
    End If
    Row(I) = 1
    GoTo 435
End If

'Mark Segment

Mark(R, C) = 1

'Clear Mark

If I > 1 And CYC = 0 Then
    For L = 1 To NDTOT
        Mark(I, L) = 0
    Next L
End If

'Determine if Path exists

If J = NDTOT Then
    P = P + 1
    Call ENDSNODE(I, J, NDTOT, Flag, CYC, Row)
Else
    Call ENDSNODE(I, J, NDTOT, Flag, CYC, Row)
    For M = 1 To AC
        Path(P, M) = 0
    Next M
End If
I = 1
J = 1
GoTo 430
End If

```

P = P - 1

'Eliminate Dummy Source and Dummy Sink Nodes

```
If SR = 1 Then
  For J = 1 To N
    If Tail(J) = 1 Then
      For I = 1 To P
        Path(I, J) = 0
      Next I
    End If
  Next J
End If
```

```
If SK = 1 Then
  For J = 1 To N
    If Head(J) = NDTOT Then
      For I = 1 To P
        Path(I, J) = 0
      Next I
    End If
  Next J
End If
```

'Reduce Path Matrix

'Zero out row(x) and col(x) arrays

```
For I = 1 To RW
  Row(I) = 0
Next I
```

```
For J = 1 To AC
  Col(J) = 0
Next J
```

'Identify zero columns in path matrix

```
For J = 1 To N
  I = 1
535:
  If Path(I, J) > 0 Or I > P Then
    GoTo 540
  Else
    I = I + 1
    GoTo 535
  End If
540:
  If I > P Then
    Col(J) = 1
  End If
Next J
```

'Pack Path Matrix

J = 1

555:

If J < N Then

    If Col(J) = 1 Then

        For K = J To N

            For I = 1 To P

                Path(I, K) = Path(I, K + 1)

            Next I

        Col(K) = Col(K + 1)

        Head(K) = Head(K + 1)

        Tail(K) = Tail(K + 1)

    Next K

    N = N - 1

    GoTo 555

Else

    J = J + 1

    GoTo 555

End If

End If

'Calculate min-cuts

'Initialize Matrix

T = 0

For J = 1 To N

    If Path(1, J) > 0 Then

        T = T + 1

        Cut(T, J) = Path(1, J)

    End If

Next J

'Loop control for multiplying path polynomial clear SW3 data arrays

MsgBox ("There are this many paths " & P)

With Sheets("Stats")

    .Cells(3, 6) = P

    .Cells(3, 4) = Date\$

    .Cells(4, 4) = Time\$

End With

For PP = 2 To P

    For I = 1 To RW

        Row(I) = 0

        XB(I) = 0

        XB1(I) = 0

        XR(I) = 0

        XR1(I) = 0

    Next I

```

For J = 1 To N
  Col(J) = 0
Next J

'Determine XR and XR1 members of A

For J = 1 To N
  If Path(PP, J) > 0 Then
    For I = 1 To T
      If Path(PP, J) = Cut(I, J) Then
        XR(I) = XR(I) + 1
        XR1(I) = J
      End If
    Next I
  End If
Next J

'Mark column of path to indicate XR1

For I = 1 To T
  If XR(I) = 1 Then
    Col(XR1(I)) = 3
  End If
Next I

'Determine XB

For I = 1 To T
  For J = 1 To N
    If Cut(I, J) > 0 Then
      XB(I) = XB(I) + 1
      XB1(I) = J
    End If
  Next J
Next I

For I = 1 To T
  If XB(I) = 1 And Path(PP, XB1(I)) > 0 Then
    Col(XB1(I)) = 1
  Else
    XB(I) = 0
  End If
Next I

'Multiply path to cutset

TT = T
For J = 1 To N

  'Avoid XB in A
  If Path(PP, J) > 0 And Col(J) <> 1 Then
    For I = 1 To TT

      'Avoid XB,XR,XR1 in A

```

```

    If XR(I) = 0 And XB(I) = 0 Then
        T = T + 1
        For L = 1 To N
            Cut(T, L) = Cut(I, L)
        Next L
        Cut(T, J) = Path(PP, J)

        'Identify residual XR1 in A
        If Col(J) = 3 Then
            XR1(T) = J
        End If
    End If
Next I
End If
Next J

'Check for XR1 Containment

For J = 1 To N
    For I = 1 To TT
        If XR1(I) = J Then
            For K = TT + 1 To T
                If XR1(K) = J Then
                    OUTT = 0
                    INN = 0
                    L = 1
                    Do While L < N
                        If Cut(I, L) > Cut(K, L) Then
                            OUTT = OUTT + 1
                        Else
                            If Cut(K, L) > Cut(I, L) Then
                                INN = INN + 1
                            End If
                        End If
                        If OUTT > 0 And INN > 0 Then
                            L = N
                        End If
                        L = L + 1
                    Loop
                    If INN > 0 And OUTT = 0 Then
                        Row(K) = 1
                    End If
                End If
            Next K
        End If
    Next I
Next J

'Move XB, XR, XR1 Terms into A

For I = 1 To TT
    If XR(I) > 0 Or XB(I) > 0 Then
        T = T + 1
        For J = 1 To N

```

```

        Cut(T, J) = Cut(I, J)
    Next J
End If
Next I

'Move A to top of cut matrix

K = 1
For I = TT + 1 To T
    For J = 1 To N
        Cut(K, J) = Cut(I, J)
    Next J
    Row(K) = Row(I)
    K = K + 1
Next I
T = K - 1

'Pack Cut

I = 1
Do While I < T
    If Row(I) > 0 Then
        For K = I + 1 To T
            For J = 1 To N
                Cut(K - 1, J) = Cut(K, J)
            Next J
            Row(K - 1) = Row(K)
        Next K
        I = I - 1
        T = T - 1
    End If
    I = I + 1
Loop

Next PP

Call ShowCutset

For I = 1 To RW
    Row(I) = 0
    For M = 1 To AC
        Path(I, M) = 0
        Cut(I, M) = 0
    Next M
Next I

For I = 1 To ND
    For J = 1 To ND
        Mark(I, J) = 0
        ARCCAP(I, J) = 0
        MATCOL(I, J) = 0
    Next J
Next I

```

```

OUTT = 0
INN = 0

With Sheets("Stats")
    .Cells(3, 5) = Date$
    .Cells(4, 5) = Time$
End With

End Sub

Sub ENDSNODE(I, J, NDTOT, Flag, CYC, Row)

Dim M As Integer

If I = 1 And CYC = 1 And J = NDTOT Then
    Flag = 1
End If

If I = 1 And CYC = 0 And J > NDTOT Then
    Flag = 1
End If

For M = 1 To NDTOT
    Row(M) = 0
Next M
CYC = 0

End Sub

Sub ShowCutset()

With Sheets("CutSets")
    .Range("a:iv").ClearContents

    Sheets("CutSets").Activate

    MsgBox ("The total number of cuts is: " & T)

With Sheets("Stats")
    .Cells(3, 8) = T
End With

For I = 1 To T
    .Cells(I, 1) = "Vulnerability Set " & I
    K = 2
    For J = 1 To N
        If Cut(I, J) > 0 Then
            If Tail(J) = Head(J) Then
                .Cells(I, K) = "Node " & Tail(J)
            Else
                .Cells(I, K) = "Link " & Tail(J) & " to " & Head(J)
            End If
            K = K + 1
        End If
    Next J
End For

```

Next J  
Next I  
  
End With  
  
End Sub



## Attribute Input Module

'This module is used to input the attributes for the evaluation measures  
'of the network.

Sub AttributeInput()

Dim J As Integer, I As Integer

With Sheets("Input")

.Range("B2:iv16384").ClearContents

Sheets("Input").Activate

iAnswer1 = MsgBox("Would you like to keep the existing Values?", vbYesNo, "Values")

If iAnswer1 = vbYes Then GoTo 10

If iAnswer1 = vbNo Then

MsgBox ("Please run the value model input prior to proceeding")

Exit Sub

End If

10:

MsgBox ("Please Enter Attribute data for each network component on selected worksheet")

.Cells(2, 2).Activate

End With

End Sub

## Value Hierarchy Input Module

'This model is used to input a value hierarchy. It allows  
'a hierarchy with 4 levels to be input. It refers to the  
'value hierarchy by levels and values, not by values, sub-objectives  
'and evaluation measures.

Sub ValueInput()

Dim I As Integer, A As Integer, L As Integer, M As Integer, N As Integer, J As Integer, K As Integer, B As Integer, O As Integer, P As Integer, Q As Integer, R As Integer  
Dim ValueA As String, Rho As Variant, level As Variant  
Dim LevelA As Integer

levels = Application.InputBox("Enter the number of levels in the Value Hierarchy.", "Value Hierarchy",  
Type:=1)  
Sheets("Stats").Cells(3, 10).Value = levels

Sheets("Values").Range("A5:iv16834").ClearContents  
Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Range("A5:iv16834").ClearContents  
Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Range("A5:iv16834").ClearContents  
Sheets("Input").Range("B1:Z1").ClearContents  
Sheets("Sub-Net Input").Range("B1:Z1").ClearContents  
Sheets("Scores").Range("B1:Z1").ClearContents

I = 1  
A = 1  
S = 1  
Z = 2  
LevelA = 2

J = InputBox("Enter number of values in level " & I)  
For K = 1 To J  
Value = Application.InputBox("Enter value " & K & " in level " & I, "Value Hierarchy", Type:=2)  
Weight = Application.InputBox("Enter weight " & K & " in level " & I, "Value Hierarchy", Type:=1)  
Sheets("Values").Cells(5, S).Value = Value  
Sheets("Values").Cells(5, S + 1).Value = Weight  
Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(5, S).Value = Value  
Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(5, S + 1).Value = Weight  
Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(5, S).Value = Value  
Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(5, S + 1).Value = Weight  
L = InputBox("Enter number of values in level " & LevelA & " under value " & K & " in level " & I)  
If L = 0 Then  
Sheets("Input").Cells(1, Z).Value = Value  
Sheets("Sub-Net Input").Cells(1, Z).Value = Value  
Sheets("Scores").Cells(1, Z).Value = Value  
Z = Z + 1  
Sheets("Values").Cells(6 + levels, S) = "Low:"  
Sheets("Values").Cells(7 + levels, S) = "High:"  
Sheets("Values").Cells(8 + levels, S) = "Mono:"  
Sheets("Values").Cells(9 + levels, S) = "Rho:"  
Sheets("Values").Cells(10 + levels, S) = "Weight:"

```

Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(6 + levels, S) = "Low:"
Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(7 + levels, S) = "High:"
Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(8 + levels, S) = "Mono:"
Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(9 + levels, S) = "Rho:"
Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(10 + levels, S) = "Weight:"
Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(6 + levels, S) = "Low:"
Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(7 + levels, S) = "High:"
Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(8 + levels, S) = "Mono:"
Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(9 + levels, S) = "Rho:"
Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(10 + levels, S) = "Weight:"
Mon = Application.InputBox("Enter the monotonicity: Increasing or Decreasing", Type:=2)
Rho = InputBox("Enter Rho")
Sheets("Values").Cells(8 + levels, S + 1) = Mon
Sheets("Values").Cells(9 + levels, S + 1) = Rho
Sheets("Values").Cells(10 + levels, S + 1) = Weight
Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(8 + levels, S + 1) = Mon
Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(9 + levels, S + 1) = Rho
Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(10 + levels, S + 1) = Weight
Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(8 + levels, S + 1) = Mon
Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(9 + levels, S + 1) = Rho
Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(10 + levels, S + 1) = Weight
Else
    For M = 1 To L
        Value = Application.InputBox("Enter value " & M & " in level " & LevelA & " under value " & K
& " in level " & I, "Value Hierarchy", Type:=2)
        Weight = Application.InputBox("Enter weight " & M & " in level " & LevelA & " under value " &
K & " in level " & I, "Value Hierarchy", Type:=1)
        Sheets("Values").Cells(6, S).Value = Value
        Sheets("Values").Cells(6, S + 1).Value = Weight
        Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(6, S).Value = Value
        Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(6, S + 1).Value = Weight
        Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(6, S).Value = Value
        Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(6, S + 1).Value = Weight
        N = InputBox("Enter number of values in level " & LevelA + 1 & " under value " & M & " in level
" & LevelA & " under value " & K & " in level " & I)
        If N = 0 Then
            Sheets("Input").Cells(1, Z).Value = Value
            Sheets("Sub-Net Input").Cells(1, Z).Value = Value
            Sheets("Scores").Cells(1, Z).Value = Value
            Z = Z + 1
            Sheets("Values").Cells(6 + levels, S) = "Low:"
            Sheets("Values").Cells(7 + levels, S) = "High:"
            Sheets("Values").Cells(8 + levels, S) = "Mono:"
            Sheets("Values").Cells(9 + levels, S) = "Rho:"
            Sheets("Values").Cells(10 + levels, S) = "Weight:"
            Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(6 + levels, S) = "Low:"
            Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(7 + levels, S) = "High:"
            Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(8 + levels, S) = "Mono:"
            Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(9 + levels, S) = "Rho:"
            Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(10 + levels, S) = "Weight:"
            Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(6 + levels, S) = "Low:"
            Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(7 + levels, S) = "High:"
            Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(8 + levels, S) = "Mono:"
            Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(9 + levels, S) = "Rho:"

```

```

Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(10 + levels, S) = "Weight:"
Mon = Application.InputBox("Enter the monotonicity: Increasing or Decreasing", Type:=2)
Rho = InputBox("Enter Rho")
Sheets("Values").Cells(8 + levels, S + 1) = Mon
Sheets("Values").Cells(9 + levels, S + 1) = Rho
Sheets("Values").Cells(10 + levels, S + 1) = Weight
Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(8 + levels, S + 1) = Mon
Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(9 + levels, S + 1) = Rho
Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(10 + levels, S + 1) = Weight
Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(8 + levels, S + 1) = Mon
Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(9 + levels, S + 1) = Rho
Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(10 + levels, S + 1) = Weight
Else
For O = 1 To N
Value = Application.InputBox("Enter value " & O & " in level " & LevelA + 1 & " under
value " & M & " in level " & LevelA & " under value " & K & " in level " & I, "Value Hierarchy",
Type:=2)
Weight = Application.InputBox("Enter weight " & O & " in level " & LevelA + 1 & " under
value " & M & " in level " & LevelA & " under value " & K & " in level " & I, "Value Hierarchy",
Type:=1)
Sheets("Values").Cells(7, S).Value = Value
Sheets("Values").Cells(7, S + 1).Value = Weight
Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(7, S).Value = Value
Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(7, S + 1).Value = Weight
Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(7, S).Value = Value
Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(7, S + 1).Value = Weight
P = InputBox("Enter number of values in level " & LevelA + 2 & " under value " & O & " in
level " & LevelA + 1 & " under value " & M & " in level " & LevelA & " under value " & K & " in level "
& I)
If P = 0 Then
Sheets("Input").Cells(1, Z).Value = Value
Sheets("Sub-Net Input").Cells(1, Z).Value = Value
Sheets("Scores").Cells(1, Z).Value = Value
Z = Z + 1
Sheets("Values").Cells(6 + levels, S) = "Low:"
Sheets("Values").Cells(7 + levels, S) = "High:"
Sheets("Values").Cells(8 + levels, S) = "Mono:"
Sheets("Values").Cells(9 + levels, S) = "Rho:"
Sheets("Values").Cells(10 + levels, S) = "Weight:"
Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(6 + levels, S) = "Low:"
Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(7 + levels, S) = "High:"
Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(8 + levels, S) = "Mono:"
Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(9 + levels, S) = "Rho:"
Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(10 + levels, S) = "Weight:"
Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(6 + levels, S) = "Low:"
Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(7 + levels, S) = "High:"
Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(8 + levels, S) = "Mono:"
Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(9 + levels, S) = "Rho:"
Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(10 + levels, S) = "Weight:"
Mon = Application.InputBox("Enter the monotonicity: Increasing or Decreasing", Type:=2)
Rho = InputBox("Enter Rho")
Sheets("Values").Cells(8 + levels, S + 1) = Mon
Sheets("Values").Cells(9 + levels, S + 1) = Rho
Sheets("Values").Cells(10 + levels, S + 1) = Weight

```

```

Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(8 + levels, S + 1) = Mon
Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(9 + levels, S + 1) = Rho
Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(10 + levels, S + 1) = Weight
Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(8 + levels, S + 1) = Mon
Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(9 + levels, S + 1) = Rho
Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(10 + levels, S + 1) = Weight
Else
For Q = 1 To P
Value = Application.InputBox("Enter value " & Q & " in level " & LevelA + 2 & " under
value " & O & " in level " & LevelA + 1 & " under value " & M & " in level " & LevelA & " under value "
& K & " in level " & I, "Value Hierarchy", Type:=2)
Weight = Application.InputBox("Enter weight " & Q & " in level " & LevelA + 2 & "
under value " & O & " in level " & LevelA + 1 & " under value " & M & " in level " & LevelA & " under
value " & K & " in level " & I, "Value Hierarchy", Type:=1)
Sheets("Values").Cells(8, S).Value = Value
Sheets("Values").Cells(8, S + 1).Value = Weight
Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(8, S).Value = Value
Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(8, S + 1).Value = Weight
Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(8, S).Value = Value
Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(8, S + 1).Value = Weight
R = InputBox("Enter number of values in level " & LevelA + 3 & " under value " & Q &
" in level " & LevelA + 2 & " under value " & O & " in level " & LevelA + 1 & " under value " & M & " in
level " & LevelA & " under value " & K & " in level " & I)
If R = 0 Then
Sheets("Input").Cells(1, Z).Value = Value
Sheets("Sub-Net Input").Cells(1, Z).Value = Value
Sheets("Scores").Cells(1, Z).Value = Value
Z = Z + 1
Sheets("Values").Cells(6 + levels, S) = "Low:"
Sheets("Values").Cells(7 + levels, S) = "High:"
Sheets("Values").Cells(8 + levels, S) = "Mono:"
Sheets("Values").Cells(9 + levels, S) = "Rho:"
Sheets("Values").Cells(10 + levels, S) = "Weight:"
Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(6 + levels, S) = "Low:"
Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(7 + levels, S) = "High:"
Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(8 + levels, S) = "Mono:"
Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(9 + levels, S) = "Rho:"
Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(10 + levels, S) = "Weight:"
Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(6 + levels, S) = "Low:"
Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(7 + levels, S) = "High:"
Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(8 + levels, S) = "Mono:"
Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(9 + levels, S) = "Rho:"
Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(10 + levels, S) = "Weight:"
Mon = Application.InputBox("Enter the monotonicity: Increasing or Decreasing",
Type:=2)
Rho = InputBox("Enter Rho")
Sheets("Values").Cells(8 + levels, S + 1) = Mon
Sheets("Values").Cells(9 + levels, S + 1) = Rho
Sheets("Values").Cells(10 + levels, S + 1) = Weight
Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(8 + levels, S + 1) = Mon
Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(9 + levels, S + 1) = Rho
Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(10 + levels, S + 1) = Weight
Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(8 + levels, S + 1) = Mon
Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(9 + levels, S + 1) = Rho

```

```

        Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(10 + levels, S + 1) = Weight
    Else
        For T = 1 To R
            Value = Application.InputBox("Enter value " & R & " in level " & LevelA + 3 & "
under value " & Q & " in level " & LevelA + 2 & " under value " & O & " in level " & LevelA + 1 & "
under value " & M & " in level " & LevelA & " under value " & K & " in level " & I, "Value Hierarchy",
Type:=2)
            Weight = Application.InputBox("Enter weight " & R & " in level " & LevelA + 3 & "
" under value " & Q & " in level " & LevelA + 2 & " under value " & O & " in level " & LevelA + 1 & "
under value " & M & " in level " & LevelA & " under value " & K & " in level " & I, "Value Hierarchy",
Type:=1)

            Sheets("Values").Cells(9, S).Value = Value
            Sheets("Values").Cells(9, S + 1).Value = Weight
            Sheets("Values").Cells(6 + levels, S) = "Low:"
            Sheets("Values").Cells(7 + levels, S) = "High:"
            Sheets("Values").Cells(8 + levels, S) = "Mono:"
            Sheets("Values").Cells(9 + levels, S) = "Rho:"
            Sheets("Values").Cells(10 + levels, S) = "Weight:"
            Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(9, S).Value = Value
            Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(9, S + 1).Value = Weight
            Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(6 + levels, S) = "Low:"
            Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(7 + levels, S) = "High:"
            Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(8 + levels, S) = "Mono:"
            Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(9 + levels, S) = "Rho:"
            Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(10 + levels, S) = "Weight:"
            Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(9, S).Value = Value
            Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(9, S + 1).Value = Weight
            Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(6 + levels, S) = "Low:"
            Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(7 + levels, S) = "High:"
            Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(8 + levels, S) = "Mono:"
            Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(9 + levels, S) = "Rho:"
            Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(10 + levels, S) = "Weight:"
            Sheets("Input").Cells(1, Z).Value = Value
            Sheets("Sub-Net Input").Cells(1, Z).Value = Value
            Sheets("Scores").Cells(1, Z).Value = Value
            Z = Z + 1
            Mon = Application.InputBox("Enter the monotonicity: Increasing or Decreasing",
Type:=2)

            Rho = InputBox("Enter Rho")
            Sheets("Values").Cells(8 + levels, S + 1) = Mon
            Sheets("Values").Cells(9 + levels, S + 1) = Rho
            Sheets("Values").Cells(10 + levels, S + 1) = Weight
            Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(8 + levels, S + 1) = Mon
            Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(9 + levels, S + 1) = Rho
            Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(10 + levels, S + 1) = Weight
            Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(8 + levels, S + 1) = Mon
            Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(9 + levels, S + 1) = Rho
            Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(10 + levels, S + 1) = Weight
        Next T
    End If
    If Q <> P Then
        S = S + 2
    End If
Next Q

```

```
        End If
        If O <> N Then
            S = S + 2
        End If
    Next O
End If
If M <> L Then
    S = S + 2
End If
Next M
End If
If K <> J Then
    S = S + 3
End If
Next K

End Sub
```

## Scoring Module

'This module was modified from Leinarts Network Disruption Modeling Tool [20]  
'It has been modified to incorporate the added capability of a user input  
'value model. It calculates the ranges of the single dimensional value  
'functions and determines the score of each vulnerability set.

Option Explicit  
Option Base 1

Dim NumCutsets As Long, L As Long, K As Long, NumMeasures As Integer

Sub ValueRange(CutsetCount As Long)

Dim I As Long, J As Long, M As Long, ValueArray() As Single  
Dim Value\_counter As Single, temp As String, comp As String, Value\_average As Single

ReDim ValueArray(1 To CutsetCount)  
NumMeasures = Sheets("Input").Range("B:iv").CurrentRegion.Columns.Count - 1  
L = 2

For K = 1 To NumMeasures  
M = 2  
J = 2

For I = 1 To CutsetCount  
Do While (Sheets("CutSets").Cells(I, J) <> "")  
temp = Sheets("CutSets").Cells(I, J).Value  
25: comp = Sheets("Input").Cells(M, 1).Value  
If temp <> comp Then  
M = M + 1  
GoTo 25  
End If  
Value\_counter = Value\_counter + Sheets("Input").Cells(M, L)  
J = J + 1  
M = 2

Loop  
Value\_average = Value\_counter / (J - 2)  
ValueArray(I) = Value\_average  
With Sheets("Scores")  
.Cells(I + 1, 1) = "Vulnerability Set" & I  
.Cells(I + 1, L) = Application.Round(ValueArray(I), 2)  
End With  
Value\_counter = 0  
J = 2  
M = 2  
Next I  
L = L + 1



Next K

End Sub

Sub RangesMaxMin(CutsetCount As Long)

Dim Min1 As Single, Max1 As Single, X As Long, Y As Long, Z As Long  
Dim NumLevels As Integer, V As Long, W As String

Z = 66

NumLevels = Sheets("Stats").Cells(3, 10).Value  
V = 1

For X = 1 To NumMeasures

45:

W = Sheets("Values").Cells(4 + NumLevels + 2, V).Value  
If W = "" Then  
V = V + 1  
GoTo 45  
End If  
V = V + 1

Min1 = Application.Min(Sheets("Scores").Range(Chr\$(Z) + ":" + Chr\$(Z)))  
Sheets("Values").Cells(4 + NumLevels + 2, V) = Application.Round(Min1, 2)  
Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(4 + NumLevels + 2, V) = Application.Round(Min1, 2)  
Max1 = Application.Max(Sheets("Scores").Range(Chr\$(Z) + ":" + Chr\$(Z)))  
Sheets("Values").Cells(4 + NumLevels + 3, V) = Application.Round(Max1, 2)  
Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(4 + NumLevels + 3, V) = Application.Round(Max1, 2)

Z = Z + 1  
V = V + 1

Next X

End Sub

Sub Scores()

NumCutsets = Sheets("CutSets").Range("a:iv").CurrentRegion.Rows.Count  
Sheets("Scores").Range("a2:iv16384").ClearContents  
Sheets("Scores").Activate  
Call ValueRange(NumCutsets)  
Call RangesMaxMin(NumCutsets)

End Sub

## Value Module

'This module was extensively modified from Lienart's Network Disruption Modeling Tool [20]. It incorporates the added capability of a user's inputted 'value model. This module calculates the value of each vulnerability set.

Option Explicit  
Option Base 1

Sub Values()

Dim NumMeasures As Integer, NumLevels As Integer, Total As Double  
Dim NumScores As Long, I As Long, J As Integer, K As Integer, Dummy As Variant  
Dim temp As Integer, L As Integer, placer As Integer, C As Integer  
Dim Msg, FirstRow As Integer, Counts As Integer, B As String, First As Variant  
Dim Col As Integer, X As Integer, T As Integer, W As String, H As Double  
Dim V As Integer, R As Integer, Z As Variant, S As Variant, Y As Double  
Dim Counter As Integer, F As Double, E As Double, P As String, G As Integer

NumMeasures = Sheets("Input").Range("B:iv").CurrentRegion.Columns.Count - 1  
NumScores = Sheets("CutSets").Range("a:iv").CurrentRegion.Rows.Count  
NumLevels = Sheets("Stats").Cells(3, 10).Value  
FirstRow = NumLevels + 14

Sheets("Values").Activate

B = Sheets("Values").Cells(FirstRow, 1).Value

If B = "" Then

GoTo 30

End If

G = 1

For J = 1 To NumMeasures

10:

W = Sheets("Values").Cells(FirstRow, G).Value

If W = "" Then

G = G + 1

GoTo 10

End If

G = G + 1

Next J

G = G + 2

15:

W = Sheets("Values").Cells(FirstRow, G).Value

If W = "" Then

GoTo 20:

End If

G = G + 1

GoTo 15:

20:

Counts = G

With Sheets("Values")

```

        .Range(Cells(FirstRow - 1, 1), Cells(FirstRow + NumScores - 1, G - 1)).ClearContents
    End With
    Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Activate
    With Sheets("Sensitivity Values")
        .Range(Cells(FirstRow - 1, 1), Cells(FirstRow + NumScores - 1, G - 1)).ClearContents
    End With
    Sheets("Values").Activate

30:
    With Sheets("Values")

For I = 1 To NumScores
    .Cells(I + 13 + NumLevels, 1) = "Vulnerability Set " & I
    Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(I + 13 + NumLevels, 1) = "Vulnerability Set " & I

    G = 1
    For J = 1 To NumMeasures

45:
        W = Sheets("Values").Cells(10 + NumLevels, G).Value
        If W = "" Then
            G = G + 1
            GoTo 45
        End If
        G = G + 1

        .Cells(I + 13 + NumLevels, G) = Application.Cells(10 + NumLevels, G).Value *
        ValueE(Sheets("Scores").Cells(I + 1, J + 1).Value, .Cells(6 + NumLevels, G).Value, .Cells(7 +
        NumLevels, G).Value, .Cells(8 + NumLevels, G).Value, .Cells(9 + NumLevels, G).Value)
        Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(I + 13 + NumLevels, G) = Application.Cells(10 + NumLevels,
        G).Value * ValueE(Sheets("Scores").Cells(I + 1, J + 1).Value, .Cells(6 + NumLevels, G).Value, .Cells(7 +
        NumLevels, G).Value, .Cells(8 + NumLevels, G).Value, .Cells(9 + NumLevels, G).Value)
        G = G + 1
    Next J

    X = 1
    T = 1
    Col = G

100:
    W = Sheets("Values").Cells(4 + T, X).Value
    If X > G Then
        GoTo 300
    End If
    If W = "" Then
        X = X + 1
        GoTo 100
    End If

    For T = 2 To NumLevels
        W = Sheets("Values").Cells(4 + T, X).Value

```

```

    If W = "" Then
        T = T - 1
        GoTo 200
    End If
Next T
If T > NumLevels Then T = T - 1
200:
    V = X
    R = X + 1
    C = X + 2

202:
    Y = 0
    H = Sheets("Values").Cells(3 + T, R).Value
    P = Sheets("Values").Cells(3 + T, R - 1).Value
205:

    Z = Sheets("Values").Cells(3 + T, C).Value
    S = Sheets("Values").Cells(4 + T, R).Value
    Dummy = Sheets("Values").Cells(5 + T, R).Value
    If Z <> "" Or S Like "??*?" Or S = "" Then GoTo 210
    If Dummy = "" Then
        Y = (Sheets("Values").Cells(I + 13 + NumLevels, R).Value) + Y
    Else
        Y = (S * Sheets("Values").Cells(I + 13 + NumLevels, R).Value) + Y
    End If
    R = R + 2
    C = C + 1
    GoTo 205
210:
    If I = 1 Then
        Sheets("Values").Cells(I + 12 + NumLevels, Col) = P
        Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(I + 12 + NumLevels, Col) = P
    End If
    Sheets("Values").Cells(I + 13 + NumLevels, Col) = Y * H
    Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(I + 13 + NumLevels, Col) = Y * H
    Col = Col + 1
    If S Like "#*#" Then
        Counter = Counter + 1
        C = C + 2
        GoTo 202
    End If

220:
    If T - 2 > 0 Then
        T = T - 2
        Counter = Counter + 1
        If I = 1 Then
            Sheets("Values").Cells(I + 12 + NumLevels, Col) = Sheets("Values").Cells(4 + T, V).Value
            Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(I + 12 + NumLevels, Col) = Sheets("Values").Cells(4 + T,
V).Value
        End If
        F = Sheets("Values").Cells(4 + T, V + 1).Value
        Do While Counter > 0

```

```

        E = (Sheets("Values").Cells(I + 13 + NumLevels, Col - Counter).Value + E)
        Counter = Counter - 1
    Loop
    Sheets("Values").Cells(I + 13 + NumLevels, Col) = F * E
    Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(I + 13 + NumLevels, Col) = F * E
    Col = Col + 1
    GoTo 220
End If

Total = Sheets("Values").Cells(I + 13 + NumLevels, Col - 1) + Total

X = X + 2
T = 1
E = 0

GoTo 100
300:
Counter = 0
If I = 1 Then
    Sheets("Values").Cells(I + 12 + NumLevels, Col).Value = "Total Score"
    Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(I + 12 + NumLevels, Col).Value = "Total Score"
End If
Sheets("Values").Cells(I + 13 + NumLevels, Col).Value = Total
Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(I + 13 + NumLevels, Col).Value = Total

Total = 0

Next I

End With

End Sub

```

## Value Function Module

'This module is taken directly from Leinart's Network Disruption Modeling Tool [20]. It is used in the value module routine and 'is used as the value function to put the evaluation measures 'on the same scale. The function is developed from Kirkwood [17].

```
Function ValueE(X, Low, High, Monotonicity, Rho)
  Select Case UCase(Monotonicity)
    Case "INCREASING"
      Difference = X - Low
    Case "DECREASING"
      Difference = High - X
  End Select
  If UCase(Rho) = "INFINITY" Then
    If (High - Low) = 0 Then
      ValueE = 0.5
    Else
      ValueE = Difference / (High - Low)
    End If
  Else
    ValueE = (1 - Exp(-Difference / Rho)) / (1 - Exp(-(High - Low) / Rho)) .
  End If
End Function
```

## Ranking Module

'This module was modified from Leinart's Network Disruption Modeling Tool [20].  
'It incorporates the added capability of a user's inputted value model.  
'It also adds the feature of identifying the components of the final list  
'of vulnerability sets. This module ranks the vulnerability sets on the  
'value sheets by their values and also gets input from the users concerning  
'how many sets to include in the final list of candidate vulnerability sets.

Dim Response1

Sub Ranking()

Dim FirstRow As Integer

Dim NumMeasures As Integer, M As Long

Dim NumScores As Long, I As Long, RowPlace As Long

Dim A, numrank As Integer, Counts As Integer

Dim Msg, W As String, G As Integer

NumMeasures = Sheets("Input").Range("B:iv").CurrentRegion.Columns.Count - 1

NumScores = Sheets("CutSets").Range("a:iv").CurrentRegion.Rows.Count

FirstRow = Sheets("Stats").Cells(3, 10).Value + 14

RowPlace = FirstRow

Sheets("TNL-Draft").Range("a:iv").ClearContents

Sheets("TNL-Final").Range("a:iv").ClearContents

Sheets("TNL-Draft").Activate

G = 1

For J = 1 To NumMeasures

45:

W = Sheets("Values").Cells(FirstRow, G).Value

If W = "" Then

G = G + 1

GoTo 45

End If

G = G + 1

Next J

G = G + 2

50:

W = Sheets("Values").Cells(FirstRow, G).Value

If W = "" Then

GoTo 55:

End If

G = G + 1

GoTo 50:

55:

Counts = G

For I = 1 To NumScores

Sheets("TNL-Draft").Cells(I, 1) = Sheets("Values").Cells(RowPlace, 1)

Sheets("TNL-Draft").Cells(I, 2) = Sheets("Values").Cells(RowPlace, Counts - 1)

RowPlace = RowPlace + 1

Next I

```

dialrank:
    Message = "Enter the number of ranked vulnerability sets desired"
    Title = "Ranking"
    A = InputBox(Message, Title)

    If A = vbCancel Then
        Exit Sub
    End If

    If A = "" Then
        GoTo dialrank
    End If

    If A > NumScores Then
        Msg = "There are not that many existing vulnerability sets"
        MsgBox Msg
        GoTo dialrank
    End If

    Worksheets("TNL-Draft").Range("a:iv").CurrentRegion.Sort _
    key1:=Worksheets("TNL-Draft").Columns("B"), order1:=xlDescending

    Sheets("TNL-Final").Activate
    For I = 1 To A
        Sheets("TNL-Final").Cells(I, 2) = Sheets("TNL-Draft").Cells(I, 1)
        Sheets("TNL-Final").Cells(I, 1) = Application.Round(Sheets("TNL-Draft").Cells(I, 2), 4)
    Next I

    M = 1

    For I = 1 To A
        temp = Sheets("TNL-Final").Cells(I, 2).Value
25:
        comp = Sheets("CutSets").Cells(M, 1).Value
        If temp <> comp Then
            M = M + 1
            GoTo 25
        End If
        J = 2
        K = 3
30:
        If Sheets("CutSets").Cells(M, J) <> "" Then
            Sheets("TNL-Final").Cells(I, K).Value = Sheets("CutSets").Cells(M, J)
            J = J + 1
            K = K + 1
            GoTo 30
        End If
        M = 1
    Next I

End Sub

```



## Sensitivity and Persistency Analysis Module

'This module performs the sensitivity analysis and persistency analysis.

Sub SensitivityAnalysis()

```
Dim K As Double, I As Integer, J As Long, L As String, M As String, N As Integer, term As String
Dim O As Integer, P As Double, Q As String, R As String, S As Integer, Number As Integer
Dim iAnswer4 As String, B As Integer, Counter As Long, NumMeasures As Integer, Name As String
Dim Data As String, T As Long, D As Double, E As Double, F As Double, G As Integer, H As Integer
Dim iAnswer As String, iAnswer2 As Integer, iAnswer3 As Integer, Base As Double, A As String, Msg
Dim Z As Integer, Y As Integer, X As Integer, W As Variant, Ave As Double, Num As Double
Dim V As Integer, AA As Integer, U As Integer, BB As Integer, FF As Integer, CC As Integer
Dim EE As Integer, Data1 As String, Data2 As Integer, Data3 As Integer, Data4 As String
Dim GG As Integer, iAnswer5 As String, Data5 As String, NumLevels As Integer
```

```
Sheets("Stats").Activate
  With Sheets("Stats")
    Range("A8:D10").ClearContents
  End With
```

```
Sheets("Persistency Analysis").Activate
  With Sheets("Persistency Analysis")
    Range("A:Z").ClearContents
  End With
```

```
Sheets("Sensitivity Analysis").Activate
  With Sheets("Sensitivity Analysis")
    Range("A:Z").ClearContents
  End With
```

```
NumLevels = Sheets("Stats").Cells(3, 10).Value
```

```
5:
FF = InputBox("How many values would you like to perform one-way sensitivity analysis on? Note: You
Can choose up to three at one time.")
```

```
If FF = False Then Exit Sub
```

```
If FF > 3 Then
  MsgBox ("Cannot do that many try again")
  GoTo 5
End If
```

```
For EE = 1 To FF
```

```
10:
```

```
iAnswer = InputBox("What is value " & EE & " that you would like to perform sensitivity analysis on?")
  If iAnswer = "" Then Exit Sub
  Sheets("Stats").Cells(EE + 7, 1).Value = iAnswer
iAnswer2 = InputBox("What level in the hierarchy is that value on?")
  If iAnswer2 = False Then Exit Sub
```

```

    Sheets("Stats").Cells(EE + 7, 2).Value = iAnswer2
    iAnswer3 = InputBox("How many values are on that sublevel?")
    If iAnswer3 = False Then Exit Sub
    Sheets("Stats").Cells(EE + 7, 3).Value = iAnswer3

    If iAnswer2 <> 1 Then
        iAnswer4 = InputBox("Which value is " & iAnswer & " under?")
        If iAnswer4 = False Then Exit Sub
        Sheets("Stats").Cells(EE + 7, 4).Value = iAnswer4
    15:
        iAnswer5 = InputBox("Is " & iAnswer & " in the last level under " & iAnswer4 & "? (Type Y for yes or N for no)")
        If iAnswer5 = False Then Exit Sub
        If iAnswer5 <> "Y" Then
            If iAnswer5 <> "N" Then
                MsgBox ("Please type Y for yes or N for no.")
                GoTo 15
            End If
        End If
        Sheets("Stats").Cells(EE + 7, 5).Value = iAnswer5
    End If

Next EE

Number = InputBox("How many vulnerability sets would you like to include in the analysis?")
If Number = False Then Exit Sub

MsgBox ("Note: The analysis will take the top " & Number & " vulnerability sets to perform the analysis, ranging the weights of of the value between 0 and 1 at an increment of .1.")

CC = 3
GG = 3

For EE = 1 To FF

    K = 0

    Data1 = Sheets("Stats").Cells(EE + 7, 1).Value
    Data2 = Sheets("Stats").Cells(EE + 7, 2).Value
    Data3 = Sheets("Stats").Cells(EE + 7, 3).Value
    Data4 = Sheets("Stats").Cells(EE + 7, 4).Value
    Data5 = Sheets("Stats").Cells(EE + 7, 5).Value

    Sheets("Sensitivity Analysis").Cells(CC, 1) = Data1
    Sheets("Persistency Analysis").Cells(GG, 1) = Data1
    Sheets("Persistency Analysis").Cells(GG, 14) = Data1

    For J = 2 To 12
        Sheets("Sensitivity Analysis").Cells(CC, J) = K
        Sheets("Sensitivity Analysis").Cells(CC, J + 12) = K
        Sheets("Persistency Analysis").Cells(GG, J) = K
        Sheets("Persistency Analysis").Cells(GG, J + 13) = K
        K = K + 0.1
    
```

Next J

Sheets("Sensitivity Analysis").Cells(2, J) = "Base Value"

For I = 1 To Number

Sheets("Sensitivity Analysis").Cells(I + CC, 1).Value = Sheets("TNL-Draft").Cells(I, 1).Value

Sheets("Sensitivity Analysis").Cells(I + CC, 13).Value = Sheets("TNL-Draft").Cells(I, 2).Value

Sheets("Sensitivity Analysis").Cells(I + CC + Number, 1).Value = Sheets("TNL-Draft").Cells(I, 1).Value & " Below 20"

Next I

N = 5

L = ""

O = 1

'Find Value

25:

Do While N < 10

L = Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(N, O).Value

If L = Data1 Then

O = O + 1

GoTo 40

End If

N = N + 1

Loop

If O = 26 Then

Msg = MsgBox("The value you selected does not exist please try again", vbOKCancel)

If Msg = vbCancel Then

Exit Sub

End If

GoTo 10

End If

O = O + 1

N = 5

GoTo 25

40:

Z = Data2 + 4

X = 2

If Data2 <> 1 Then

45:

W = Sheets("Values").Cells(Z - 1, X - 1).Value

If W <> Data4 Then

X = X + 1

GoTo 45

End If

End If

```

S = 2
P = 0
Do While P < 1 Or P = 1

B = X

Base = Sheets("Values").Cells(N, O).Value
Sheets("Sensitivity Analysis").Cells(CC, 13).Value = Base

'Change Weights

For I = 1 To Data3
    term = Sheets("Values").Cells(Z, B - 1).Value
    If Data1 <> term Then
        Num = Sheets("Values").Cells(Z, B).Value
        Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(Z, B).Value = Application.Round(((Num / (1 - Base)) * (1 - P)), 2)
        If Data5 = "Y" Then
            Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(10 + NumLevels, B) = Application.Round(((Num / (1 - Base)) *
(1 - P)), 2)
        End If
    End If
    If Data1 = term Then
        Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(Z, B).Value = P
        If Data5 = "Y" Then
            Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(10 + NumLevels, B) = P
        End If
    End If
    If I <> Data3 Then
48:
        W = Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(N, B + 1).Value
        If W = "" Then
            B = B + 1
            GoTo 48
        End If
        B = B + 2
    Else
        B = B + 2
    End If
Next I

    Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(N, O).Value = P

'Recalculate Vulnerability Values
    Call SensitivityValues

'Rank Vulnerability Sets
    Call SensitivityTNL

'Record Vulnerability values and rank #
    For I = 1 To Number
        J = 1
50:

```

```

    Q = Sheets("Sensitivity Analysis").Cells(I + CC, 1).Value
    R = Sheets("Sensitivity TNL").Cells(J, 1).Value
    If Q Like R Then
        GoTo 60
    End If
    J = J + 1
    GoTo 50
60:
    Sheets("Sensitivity Analysis").Cells(I + CC, S).Value = Sheets("Sensitivity TNL").Cells(J, 2).Value
    Sheets("Sensitivity Analysis").Cells(I + CC, S + 12).Value = J
Next I

G = 2
H = 14
T = 1
For I = 1 To Number
    Do
        T = Sheets("Sensitivity Analysis").Cells(I + CC, H).Value
        If T = 0 Then GoTo 80
        If T > 20 Then
            D = Sheets("Sensitivity Analysis").Cells(CC, H).Value
70:
            If G < 13 Then
                F = Sheets("Sensitivity Analysis").Cells(CC, G).Value
                If F = D Then
                    E = Sheets("Sensitivity Analysis").Cells(I + CC, G).Value
                    GoTo 75
                End If
                G = G + 1
                GoTo 70
            End If
75:
            Sheets("Sensitivity Analysis").Cells(I + CC + Number, G).Value = E
            End If
            G = 2
            H = H + 1
        Loop
80:
        H = 14
        G = 2
        T = 1
    Next I

'Persistency Analysis

Data = "Sensitivity TNL"
NumMeasures = Sheets("Input").Range("A:A").CurrentRegion.Rows.Count - 1

For I = 1 To NumMeasures
    Name = Sheets("Input").Cells(I + 1, 1).Value
    With Worksheets(Data).Range("A1:Z20")

```

```

Set C = .Find(What:=Name, LookIn:=xlValues)
If Not C Is Nothing Then
    firstAddress = C.Address

    Do
        Counter = Counter + 1
        Set C = .FindNext(C)

    Loop While Not C Is Nothing And C.Address <> firstAddress
End If
End With

Sheets("Persistency Analysis").Cells(I + GG, 1).Value = Name
Sheets("Persistency Analysis").Cells(I + GG, S).Value = Counter
Counter = 0
Next I

T = 1
V = GG + 1
For I = 1 To NumMeasures
    For J = 2 To 12
        U = Sheets("Persistency Analysis").Cells(I + GG, J).Value
        If U <> 0 Then
            For AA = 14 To 25
                Sheets("Persistency Analysis").Cells(V, AA).Value = Sheets("Persistency Analysis").Cells(I + GG, T).Value
                T = T + 1
            Next AA
            V = V + 1
            GoTo 90
        End If
        T = 1
    Next J
90:
    T = 1
Next I

P = P + 0.1
S = S + 1

Loop

'Put Back to Base Value

P = Base

B = X

Base = Sheets("Values").Cells(N, O).Value
Sheets("Sensitivity Analysis").Cells(CC, 13).Value = Base

For I = 1 To Data3
    term = Sheets("Values").Cells(Z, B - 1).Value
    If Data1 <> term Then

```

```

    Num = Sheets("Values").Cells(Z, B).Value
    Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(Z, B).Value = Application.Round(((Num / (1 - Base)) * (1 - P)), 2)
    If Data5 = "Y" Then
        Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(10 + NumLevels, B).Value = Application.Round(((Num / (1 -
Base)) * (1 - P)), 2)
    End If
End If
If Data1 = term Then
    Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(Z, B).Value = P
    If Data5 = "Y" Then
        Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(10 + NumLevels, B).Value = P
    End If
End If
If I <> Data3 Then
100:
    W = Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(N, B + 1).Value
    If W = "" Then
        B = B + 1
        GoTo 100
    End If
    B = B + 2
Else
    B = B + 2
End If
Next I

Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(N, O).Value = P

Call ChartMaker(Data1, Number, CC)
Call Chart(Data1, V, GG)

CC = CC + (2 * Number) + 2
GG = GG + NumMeasures + 2
Next EE

End Sub

Sub SensitivityValues()

Dim NumMeasures As Integer, NumLevels As Integer, Total As Double
Dim NumScores As Long, I As Long, J As Long, K As Integer
Dim temp As Integer, L As Integer, placer As Integer, C As Integer
Dim Msg, FirstRow As Integer, A As Integer, Dummy As Variant
Dim Col As Integer, X As Integer, T As Long, W As String, H As Double
Dim V As Integer, R As Integer, Z As Variant, S As Variant, Y As Double
Dim Counter As Integer, F As Double, E As Double, P As String, G As Integer

NumMeasures = Sheets("Input").Range("B:iv").CurrentRegion.Columns.Count - 1
NumScores = Sheets("CutSets").Range("a:iv").CurrentRegion.Rows.Count
NumLevels = Sheets("Stats").Cells(3, 10).Value
FirstRow = NumLevels + 14

```

```

G = 1
For J = 1 To NumMeasures
10:
    W = Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(FirstRow, G).Value
    If W = "" Then
        G = G + 1
        GoTo 10
    End If
    G = G + 1
Next J
G = G + 2
A = G
15:
W = Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(FirstRow, A).Value
If W = "" Then
    GoTo 20:
End If
A = A + 1
GoTo 15:
20:

Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Activate
With Sheets("Sensitivity Values")
    .Range(Cells(FirstRow - 1, 1), Cells(FirstRow + NumScores - 1, A)).ClearContents
End With

30:
With Sheets("Sensitivity Values")

For I = 1 To NumScores
    .Cells(I + 13 + NumLevels, 1) = "Vulnerability Set " & I

    G = 1
    For J = 1 To NumMeasures

45:
        W = Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(10 + NumLevels, G).Value
        If W = "" Then
            G = G + 1
            GoTo 45
        End If
        G = G + 1

        .Cells(I + 13 + NumLevels, G) = Application.Cells(10 + NumLevels, G).Value *
ValueE(Sheets("Scores").Cells(I + 1, J + 1).Value, .Cells(6 + NumLevels, G).Value, .Cells(7 +
NumLevels, G).Value, .Cells(8 + NumLevels, G).Value, .Cells(9 + NumLevels, G).Value)

        G = G + 1

    Next J

X = 1

```



```

T = 1
Col = G

100:
W = Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(4 + T, X).Value
If X > G Then
    GoTo 300
End If
If W = "" Then
    X = X + 1
    GoTo 100
End If

For T = 2 To NumLevels
    W = Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(4 + T, X).Value

    If W = "" Then
        T = T - 1
        GoTo 200
    End If
Next T
If T > NumLevels Then T = T - 1

200:
V = X
R = X + 1
C = X + 2

202:
Y = 0
H = Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(3 + T, R).Value
P = Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(3 + T, R - 1).Value

205:
Z = Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(3 + T, C).Value
S = Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(4 + T, R).Value
Dummy = Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(5 + T, R).Value
If Z <> "" Or S Like "??*?" Or S = "" Then GoTo 210
If Dummy = "" Then
    Y = Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(I + 13 + NumLevels, R).Value + Y
Else
    Y = (S * Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(I + 13 + NumLevels, R).Value) + Y
End If
R = R + 2
C = C + 1
GoTo 205

210:
If I = 1 Then
    Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(I + 12 + NumLevels, Col) = P
End If
Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(I + 13 + NumLevels, Col) = Y * H
Col = Col + 1
If S Like "#*#" Then
    Counter = Counter + 1

```

```

        C = C + 2
        GoTo 202
    End If

220:
    If T - 2 > 0 Then
        T = T - 2
        Counter = Counter + 1
        If I = 1 Then
            Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(I + 12 + NumLevels, Col) = Sheets("Values").Cells(4 + T,
V).Value
        End If
        F = Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(4 + T, V + 1).Value
        Do While Counter > 0
            E = (Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(I + 13 + NumLevels, Col - Counter).Value + E)
            Counter = Counter - 1
        Loop
        Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(I + 13 + NumLevels, Col) = F * E
        Col = Col + 1
        GoTo 220
    End If

    Total = Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(I + 13 + NumLevels, Col - 1) + Total

    X = X + 2
    T = 1
    E = 0

GoTo 100
300:
Counter = 0
If I = 1 Then
    Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(I + 12 + NumLevels, Col).Value = "Total Score"
End If
Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(I + 13 + NumLevels, Col).Value = Total

Total = 0

Next I

End With
Sheets("Sensitivity Analysis").Activate

End Sub

Sub SensitivityTNL()

Dim FirstRow As Integer
Dim NumMeasures As Integer
Dim NumScores As Long, I As Long, RowPlace As Long
Dim A, numrank As Integer
Dim Msg, M As Long

NumMeasures = Sheets("Input").Range("B:iv").CurrentRegion.Columns.Count - 1

```

```

NumScores = Sheets("CutSets").Range("A:Z").CurrentRegion.Rows.Count
FirstRow = Sheets("Stats").Cells(3, 10).Value + 14
RowPlace = FirstRow
Sheets("Sensitivity TNL").Range("A:Z").ClearContents

```

```

G = 1
For J = 1 To NumMeasures
45:
    W = Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(FirstRow, G).Value
    If W = "" Then
        G = G + 1
        GoTo 45
    End If
    G = G + 1
Next J

```

```

G = G + 2
50:
W = Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(FirstRow, G).Value
If W = "" Then
    GoTo 55:
End If
G = G + 1
GoTo 50:
55:
Counts = G

```

```

For I = 1 To NumScores
    Sheets("Sensitivity TNL").Cells(I, 1) = Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(RowPlace, 1)
    Sheets("Sensitivity TNL").Cells(I, 2) = Sheets("Sensitivity Values").Cells(RowPlace, Counts - 1)
    RowPlace = RowPlace + 1
Next I

```

```

Worksheets("Sensitivity TNL").Range("A:iv").CurrentRegion.Sort _
key1:=Worksheets("Sensitivity TNL").Columns("B"), order1:=xlDescending

```

```

M = 1

```

```

For I = 1 To 20
    temp = Sheets("Sensitivity TNL").Cells(I, 1).Value
25:
    comp = Sheets("CutSets").Cells(M, 1).Value
    If temp <> comp Then
        M = M + 1
        GoTo 25
    End If
    J = 2
    K = 3
30:
    If Sheets("CutSets").Cells(M, J) <> "" Then
        Sheets("Sensitivity TNL").Cells(I, K).Value = Sheets("CutSets").Cells(M, J)
        J = J + 1
        K = K + 1
        GoTo 30
    End If

```

```

        End If
        M = 1
    Next I

End Sub

Sub ChartMaker(Val As String, Num As Integer, DD As Integer)

Range(Cells(DD, 1), Cells(2 * Num + DD, 12)).Name = "TestRange"

Charts.Add

ActiveChart.ChartWizard _
    Source:=Sheets("Sensitivity Analysis").Range("TestRange"), _
    Gallery:=xlLine, _
    Format:=4, _
    PlotBy:=xlRows, _
    CategoryLabels:=1, _
    SeriesLabels:=1, _
    HasLegend:=True, Title:="One-Way Sensitivity Analysis", CategoryTitle:=Val & " Weight",
    ValueTitle:="Vulnerability Set Value"

ActiveChart.Location xlLocationAutomatic, "Sensitivity Chart"

End Sub

Sub Chart(Val As String, Num As Integer, DD As Integer)

Sheets("Persistency Analysis").Activate

Range(Cells(DD, 14), Cells(Num - 1, 25)).Name = "TestRange"

Charts.Add

ActiveChart.ChartWizard _
    Source:=Sheets("Persistency Analysis").Range("TestRange"), _
    Gallery:=xlLine, _
    Format:=1, _
    PlotBy:=xlRows, _
    CategoryLabels:=1, _
    SeriesLabels:=1, _
    HasLegend:=True, Title:="Persistency Analysis", CategoryTitle:=Val & "Weight",
    ValueTitle:="Recurrence"

ActiveChart.Location Where:=xlLocationAutomatic, _
    Name:="Persistency Chart"

End Sub

```

## Occurrence Analysis Module

'This module is used to perform Occurrence Analysis which determines  
'the number of times a node or link appears in the list of vulnerability  
'sets. It then calculates the percent of occurrence and plots it on a chart.

Sub Occurrence()

Dim Counter As Long, NumMeasures As Integer, I As Integer  
Dim Name As String, Data As String, NumCuts As Long

Sheets("Occurrence Analysis").Activate  
With Sheets("Occurrence Analysis")  
Range("A:C").ClearContents  
End With

10:  
Data = "CutSets"

NumCuts = Sheets("CutSets").Range("A:A").CurrentRegion.Rows.Count  
NumMeasures = Sheets("Input").Range("A:A").CurrentRegion.Rows.Count - 1

For I = 1 To NumMeasures

    Name = Sheets("Input").Cells(I + 1, 1).Value

    With Worksheets(Data).Range("A:Z")

        Set C = .Find(What:=Name, LookIn:=xlValues)

    If Not C Is Nothing Then  
        firstAddress = C.Address

        Do  
            Counter = Counter + 1  
            Set C = .FindNext(C)  
        Loop While Not C Is Nothing And C.Address <> firstAddress

    End If

End With  
Sheets("Occurrence Analysis").Cells(I, 1).Value = Name  
Sheets("Occurrence Analysis").Cells(I, 3).Value = Counter  
Sheets("Occurrence Analysis").Cells(I, 2).Value = Application.Round((Counter / NumCuts), 2)

Counter = 0

Next I

Call Chart

End Sub

```

Sub Chart()

Num = Sheets("Occurrence Analysis").Range("A:A").Rows.Count

Range(Cells(1, 1), Cells(Num, 2)).Name = "TestRange"

Charts.Add

ActiveChart.ChartWizard _
    Source:=Sheets("Occurrence Analysis").Range("TestRange"), _
    Gallery:=xlColumn, _
    Format:=2, _
    PlotBy:=xlColumns, _
    CategoryLabels:=1, _
    SeriesLabels:=1, _
    HasLegend:=False, Title:="Occurrence Analysis", CategoryTitle:="Component", ValueTitle:="Percent
Occurrence"

ActiveChart.Location Where:=xlLocationAutomatic, _
    Name:="Occurrence Chart"

End Sub

```

## Sub-Network Input Module

'This module is used to input the data for the sub-network.  
'Components can either be manually input or the routine will  
'let the user input the sub-network components for the nodes  
'which are found in the final list of vulnerability sets.

Dim I As Integer, K As Integer, J As Integer, M As Integer, H As Integer, Number As Integer  
Dim temp As String, comp As String, L As Variant, N As Variant, Data As String

Sub SubNetworkInput()

```
1:
iAnswer = MsgBox("Do you want to use the most critical nodes for the sub-network?", vbYesNo, "Sub-
Network")
If iAnswer = vbYes Then GoTo Continue
If iAnswer = vbNo Then
    MsgBox ("Please enter sub-network components on worksheet")
    Exit Sub
End If
```

Continue:

```
Sheets("Sub-Net Input").Range("A2:iv16834").ClearContents
Sheets("Sub-Net Input").Range("A2:iv16834").ClearFormats
Sheets("Sub-Net Input").Activate
```

I = Sheets("TNL-Final").Range("a:iv").CurrentRegion.Rows.Count

H = 2

K = 3

For J = 1 To I

10:

```
Do While Sheets("TNL-Final").Cells(J, K) <> ""
    temp = Sheets("TNL-Final").Cells(J, K).Value
```

Number = Sheets("Sub-Net Input").Range("A:iv").CurrentRegion.Rows.Count

For A = 1 To Number

Data = Sheets("Sub-Net Input").Cells(A, 1)

If temp = Data Then

K = K + 1

GoTo 10

End If

Next A

comp = "???? #"

If temp Like comp Then

Sheets("Sub-Net Input").Cells(H, 1) = temp

Sheets("Sub-Net Input").Cells(H, 1).Font.Color = RGB(255, 0, 0)

iAnswer1 = MsgBox("Enter Sub-Network components for " & temp, vbOKCancel, "Sub-Network  
Components")

H = H + 1

If iAnswer1 = vbCancel Then Exit Sub

MsgBox ("When node entry is completed type End")

```

20:
    iAnswer2 = Application.InputBox("Enter Sub-Node", "Nodes", Type:=2)
    If iAnswer2 = "End" Or iAnswer2 = "end" Then GoTo 30
    If iAnswer2 = False Then Exit Sub
    Sheets("Sub-Net Input").Cells(H, 1) = iAnswer2
    H = H + 1
    GoTo 20

30:
    iAnswer3 = MsgBox("Click OK to enter Links. Click Cancel to exit routine.", vbOKCancel, "Sub-
Network " & temp)

    If iAnswer3 = vbCancel Then Exit Sub

    MsgBox ("When arc entry is completed enter End for the tail.")

40:
    N = Application.InputBox("Enter arc tail", "Link", Type:=2)

    If N = "End" Or N = "end" Then
        GoTo 50
    End If
    If N = False Then Exit Sub

    L = Application.InputBox("Enter arc head", "Link", Type:=2)

    If L = False Then Exit Sub

    Sheets("Sub-Net Input").Cells(H, 1) = "Link " & N & " to " & L
    H = H + 1

    GoTo 40

50:

    End If
    K = K + 1
    Loop
    K = 3
Next J

End Sub

```



## Sub-Network Values Module

'This module is modified from the Values module. It is used to on the sub-network.  
'It calculates the value of each vulnerability using the data on the sub-net input sheet.

Option Explicit  
Option Base 1

Sub SubNetValues()

Dim NumMeasures As Integer, NumLevels As Integer, Total As Double  
Dim NumScores As Integer, I As Integer, J As Integer, K As Integer  
Dim temp As Integer, L As Integer, placer As Integer, C As Integer  
Dim Msg, FirstRow As Integer, Counts As Integer, B As String, First As Variant  
Dim Col As Integer, X As Integer, T As Integer, W As String, H As Double  
Dim V As Integer, R As Integer, Z As Variant, S As Variant, Y As Double  
Dim Counter As Integer, F As Double, E As Double, P As String, G As Integer  
Dim Dummy As Variant

NumMeasures = Sheets("Sub-Net Input").Range("B:iv").CurrentRegion.Columns.Count - 1  
NumScores = Sheets("Sub-Net Input").Range("a:iv").CurrentRegion.Rows.Count - 1  
NumLevels = Sheets("Stats").Cells(3, 10).Value  
FirstRow = NumLevels + 14

Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Activate

Call SubRangesMaxMin

B = Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(FirstRow, 1).Value  
If B = "" Then  
    GoTo 30  
End If  
G = 1  
For J = 1 To NumMeasures  
10:    W = Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(FirstRow, G).Value  
        If W = "" Then  
            G = G + 1  
            GoTo 10  
        End If  
        G = G + 1  
    Next J  
    G = G + 2  
15:    W = Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(FirstRow, G).Value  
        If W = "" Then  
            GoTo 20:  
        End If  
        G = G + 1  
        GoTo 15  
20:    Counts = G

```

With Sheets("Sub-Net Values")
    .Range(Cells(FirstRow - 1, 1), Cells(FirstRow + NumScores - 1, G - 1)).ClearContents
End With

30:
With Sheets("Sub-Net Values")

For I = 1 To NumScores
    .Cells(I + 13 + NumLevels, 1) = "Vulnerability " & I

    G = 1
    For J = 1 To NumMeasures
45:
        W = Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(10 + NumLevels, G).Value
        If W = "" Then
            G = G + 1
            GoTo 45
        End If
        G = G + 1

        .Cells(I + 13 + NumLevels, G) = Application.Cells(10 + NumLevels, G).Value *
ValueE(Sheets("Sub-Net Input").Cells(I + 1, J + 1).Value, .Cells(6 + NumLevels, G).Value, .Cells(7 +
NumLevels, G).Value, .Cells(8 + NumLevels, G).Value, .Cells(9 + NumLevels, G).Value)
        G = G + 1
    Next J

    X = 1
    T = 1
    Col = G

100:
    W = Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(4 + T, X).Value
    If X > G Then
        GoTo 300
    End If
    If W = "" Then
        X = X + 1
        GoTo 100
    End If

    For T = 2 To NumLevels
        W = Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(4 + T, X).Value

        If W = "" Then
            T = T - 1
            GoTo 200
        End If
    Next T
    If T > NumLevels Then T = T - 1
200:
    V = X
    R = X + 1
    C = X + 2

```

```

202:
    Y = 0
    H = Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(3 + T, R).Value
    P = Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(3 + T, R - 1).Value
205:
    Z = Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(3 + T, C).Value
    S = Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(4 + T, R).Value
    Dummy = Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(5 + T, R).Value
    If Z <> "" Or S Like "??*?" Or S = "" Then GoTo 210
    If Dummy = "" Then
        Y = Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(I + 13 + NumLevels, R).Value + Y
    Else
        Y = (S * Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(I + 13 + NumLevels, R).Value) + Y
    End If
    R = R + 2
    C = C + 1
    GoTo 205
210:
    If I = 1 Then
        Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(I + 12 + NumLevels, Col) = P
    End If

    Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(I + 13 + NumLevels, Col) = Y * H
    Col = Col + 1
    If S Like "#*#" Then
        Counter = Counter + 1
        C = C + 2
        GoTo 202
    End If

220:

    If T - 2 > 0 Then
        T = T - 2
        Counter = Counter + 1
        If I = 1 Then
            Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(I + 12 + NumLevels, Col) = Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(4 +
T, V).Value
        End If
        F = Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(4 + T, V + 1).Value
        Do While Counter > 0
            E = (Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(I + 13 + NumLevels, Col - Counter).Value + E)
            Counter = Counter - 1
        Loop
        Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(I + 13 + NumLevels, Col) = F * E
        Col = Col + 1
        GoTo 220
    End If

    Total = Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(I + 13 + NumLevels, Col - 1) + Total

    X = X + 2
    T = 1
    E = 0

```

```

GoTo 100
300:
Counter = 0
If I = 1 Then
    Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(I + 12 + NumLevels, Col).Value = "Total Score"
End If
Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(I + 13 + NumLevels, Col).Value = Total

Total = 0

Next I

End With

End Sub

Sub SubRangesMaxMin()

Dim Min1 As Single, Max1 As Single, X As Integer, Y As Integer, Z As Integer
Dim NumMeasures As Integer, NumLevels As Integer, V As Integer, W As String

NumMeasures = Sheets("Sub-Net Input").Range("B:iv").CurrentRegion.Columns.Count - 1
NumLevels = Sheets("Stats").Cells(3, 10).Value

Z = 66
V = 1

For X = 1 To NumMeasures

45:
    W = Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(4 + NumLevels + 2, V).Value
    If W = "" Then
        V = V + 1
        GoTo 45
    End If
    V = V + 1

    Min1 = Application.Min(Sheets("Sub-Net Input").Range(Chr$(Z) + ":" + Chr$(Z)))
    Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(4 + NumLevels + 2, V) = Application.Round(Min1, 2)
    Max1 = Application.Max(Sheets("Sub-Net Input").Range(Chr$(Z) + ":" + Chr$(Z)))
    Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(4 + NumLevels + 3, V) = Application.Round(Max1, 2)

    Z = Z + 1
    V = V + 1
Next X

End Sub

```

## Sub-Network Ranking Module

'This module was modified from the TNL Mod module. It is modified to perform the  
'functions for the sub-network. It ranks the vulnerabilities on the sub-net value  
'sheet by their values and lists the sub-network components for each.

Sub SubNetRanking()

Dim FirstRow As Integer

Dim NumMeasures As Integer

Dim NumScores As Integer, I As Integer, RowPlace As Integer

Dim numrank As Integer

Dim Msg

NumMeasures = Sheets("Sub-Net Input").Range("B:iv").CurrentRegion.Columns.Count - 1

NumScores = Sheets("Sub-Net Input").Range("a:iv").CurrentRegion.Rows.Count - 1

FirstRow = Sheets("Stats").Cells(3, 10).Value + 14

RowPlace = FirstRow

Sheets("Sub-Net TNL").Range("a:iv").ClearContents

Sheets("Sub-Net TNL").Activate

G = 1

For J = 1 To NumMeasures

45:

W = Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(FirstRow, G).Value

If W = "" Then

G = G + 1

GoTo 45

End If

G = G + 1

Next J

G = G + 2

50:

W = Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(FirstRow, G).Value

If W = "" Then

GoTo 55:

End If

G = G + 1

GoTo 50:

55:

Counts = G

For I = 1 To NumScores

Sheets("Sub-Net TNL").Cells(I, 2) = Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(RowPlace, 1)

Sheets("Sub-Net TNL").Cells(I, 1) = Sheets("Sub-Net Values").Cells(RowPlace, Counts - 1)

RowPlace = RowPlace + 1

Next I

M = 1

For I = 2 To NumScores + 1

```

If Sheets("Sub-Net Input").Cells(I, 1).Value = "" Then
    comp = Sheets("Sub-Net Input").Cells(I, 2).Value
Else
    comp = Sheets("Sub-Net Input").Cells(I, 1).Value
End If

Sheets("Sub-Net TNL").Cells(I - 1, 3).Value = comp

Next I

Worksheets("Sub-Net TNL").Range("a:iv").CurrentRegion.Sort _
    key1:=Worksheets("Sub-Net TNL").Columns("A"), order1:=xlDescending

End Sub

```

## Vita

Captain Karilynne Wallace was born on 11 August, 1972 in Gunnison, Utah. She graduated from Gunnison Valley High School in 1990 and entered undergraduate studies at Utah State University in Logan, Utah. She graduated with a Bachelor of Science degree in Mathematics in June 1994. She received her commission upon graduation from college and her completion of training with the Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps.

Her first assignment was at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California as a Program Manager and Range Control Officer. In August 1997, she entered the Graduate School of Engineering, Air Force Institute of Technology. Captain Wallace's follow-on assignment was to the 17<sup>th</sup> Test Squadron at Schriever Air Force Base in Colorado.

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